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In the past decade, the United States’ oil and gas industry experienced an extraordinary boom, 
due to shale gas. Shale gas accounted for only 1.6% of total US natural gas production in 2000, 
4.1% by 2005, and an astonishing 23.1% by 2010. This remarkable growth has spurred interest 
in exploring for shale gas resources elsewhere. The purpose of the study is how the rise of 
fracking in the USA has impacted its foreign policy towards climate change. An exploratory 
qualitative method, known as process-tracing was used, with the aim of providing evidence-
based literature in order to explore the change in the USA’s domestic energy and climate 
policies; as well to see the change in its stance on climate change on the international platform. 
Some of the key concluding findings relate to the Obama Administration’s championing of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1) Purpose of this study 
 
The reason for this study is because the hydraulic fracturing technology for extracting natural 
gas and oil from shale rock formations, has generated heated debate. Among other concerns, 
primarily questions have been raised over the amounts of water consumed during the process 
and the possible contamination of groundwater supplies (Nadis, 2013). Even though the 
environmental controversy is far from settled, the technology is steadily rising in the United 
States, and the attendant surge in shale gas production over the past decade has created a 
shock to natural gas on the energy markets (Nadis, 2013). 
 
1.2) Context of the study 
 
In 2007, Energy companies first began to realise that the United States of America (hereon 
referred to as the United States, America, US or USA) contained large reserves of natural gas 
trapped in underground shale-rock formations, which is an easily-breakable soft rock that is 
formed from the compaction of silt and clay-size mineral particles, commonly known as mud 
(Minerals Education Coalitions, 2017). This composition of the rock categorises it as a 
sedimentary rock, known as mudstones. The rock is fissile (made up of fine grains of 
sedimentary rocks that allows it to break easily) and laminated (made up of this layers) 
(Minerals Education Coalitions, 2017). It occurs in a wide range of colours, including red, green, 
brown, grey and black. Black shale-rocks contain organic material that sometimes breaks down 
to form natural gas or oil. Other shale-rocks can be crushed and mixed with water to produce 
clays that can be made into a variety of useful objects (Geology.com. 2017).  
 
These shale-rock formations could be accessed through new hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling techniques. Environmentalists (whether it be individuals or groups) hailed this as a 
major green breakthrough. “After all, natural gas is much cleaner than coal, which had been 
America's dominant power source for decades. Burning gas for electricity instead of coal leads 
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to fewer particulates in the air, less smog, and less planet-warming carbon dioxide. Robert F. 
Kennedy touted shale gas as key to ending the nation's ‘deadly coal addiction’” (Plumer, 2015). 
 
Briefly, hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, is the process of injecting liquid at 
high pressures into underground rocks so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or 
gas. The use of fracking since then has been continuously rising, specifically in Texas, 
Pennsylvania, and Arkansas. As a result, US natural gas production has spiked, with many 
electric utilities changing from coal to cheaper natural gas. The Sierra Club, the largest and most 
influential grassroots environmental organisation in the USA, launched a highly successful 
campaign to convince utility regulators to retire many of the now-uneconomical coal plants 
(Sierra Club, 2017). USA's carbon dioxide emissions have been reduced by 10% since 2005 
(though shale gas only deserves part of the credit for that) (Parry, 2013). 
 
Environmentalists were however also beginning to react negatively to the fracking boom. There 
was growing concern that the process could contaminate nearby fresh drinking water supplies. 
Green groups, like 350.org, among others, also worried that the methane leaks from fracking 
operations could partly or even totally undermine the climate benefits from switching to gas. 
Therefore, awareness of the environmental effects of fracking is constantly being raised by 
environmental organisations (Plumer, 2015). “As of recent times, it is tough to find an 
environmental group that supports fracking. Many groups now favour outright bans on the 
practice – a stance that New York State adopted last fall. The Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) has argued that it's better to focus on improving oversight and patching those methane 
leaks. But if anything, EDF is an outlier” (Plumer, 2015). 
 
According to a number of studies, even though natural gas – a fossil fuel – is cleaner than coal, 
fracking alone, does not fix climate change. Ultimately, in order to avoid global warming, 
cleaner sources of energy need to be looked into, something which politicians like Jeb Bush 
missed when they suggested that fracking alone can be a solution to climate change. However, 
the large reserves of shale gas can be used to pave the way for climate policies that gradually 
reduce emissions over time and help nurture even cleaner sources (Plumer, 2015). Arguably, it 
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is no doubt that the fracking boom had made it much easier for the Obama Administration to 
design the forthcoming EPA rules to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, as the 
availability of shale gas makes compliance cheaper. In addition, the fracking boom has sharply 
eroded the political power of coal companies, which have long been a major opponent of 
climate policies (Plumer, 2015). It is to be noted that this study is primarily focused on the Bush 
and Obama Administrations, however the Trump Administration has taken over since 
November 2016. 
 
1.3) Key research questions 
 
The key research question posed for the study was: How has the rise of fracking impacted USA 
foreign policy towards climate change? 
 
Other research questions that were also posed for the study were: 
 
What are the reasons for the limited success of the Kyoto Protocol? 
How does the 2015 Paris Agreement differ from the Kyoto Protocol? 
What lessons can be learnt from the experience of the Kyoto Protocol? 
In particular, why is the role of the US critical to ensuring the success of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement? 
Given the energy sector trends in the US, what is the likelihood of the US meeting the 
greenhouse gas emission targets for a low carbon future? 
 
1.4) Structure of the report 
 
This paper will aim to address how the United States of America’s energy policy has been able 
to foster the fracking industry; the impact on the global oil supply; the social and ecological 
impacts, and how it feeds into the climate crisis.  
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 The theory and literature review are addressed in chapter 2. The theoretical perspective is 
based on Green International Political Economy, with a Neo-Gramscian approach to the 
theory – this is done in order to address the social forces that shape IPE.  
 This is followed by chapter 3, the methodology chapter that sets out how the research 
questions were answered, information sourced, and some of the challenges that were faced 
whilst writing up the paper.  
 With the theoretical perspective and methodology of the paper explained, chapter 4, titled 
USA’s Fossil Fuel Industry and Fracking, attempts to provide the following: 
- A brief historical background to the USA’s fossil fuel industry and the rise of fracking. 
- Explain what fracking is, discuss its advantages and disadvantages, why it is surrounded 
by controversy, and the water storage issue. 
 USA’s domestic fossil fuel industry and the international climate policy is explained in 
chapter 5, which is aimed at: 
- Locating the power of the domestic fossil industry, in the sense who owns, controls and 
drives it, as well as how powerful the federal government is, and what is the link to the 
fossil fuel industry.  
- The Kyoto Protocol, its limitations and Pledge and Review (that is, what are they, what 
role did the US play, and how the domestic forces share the US’s approach to this) has 
traced these.  
- An explanation as to what the impact of these domestic forces had on parties, public 
discourse, and how did the ruling elites respond to these pressures (if any). That is how 
Clinton, Bush Junior and Obama reacted to the domestic pressures and international 
policy engagements.  
 Chapter 6, the final chapter titled, USA’s Domestic Fossil Fuel Industry and Domestic Climate 
policy, covers the following: 
- It aims to set out the shifts in the fossil fuel industry with a rise of renewables.  
- It then looks at state shifts and Obama’s attempts to use the Clean Air Act, such that how 
he had been blocked in Congress, how things were changing, where fracking fits into this 
and whether it was transitionary. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review 
 
2.1) Green IPE 
 
Green International Political Economy (Green IPE, which is also referred to as GIPE) emerged in 
the 1970s onwards, due to an increased interest in the sub-field of International Relations that 
was concerned with international environmental cooperation, and the key focus of this is the 
management of common pool resources (examples of this would be oceans, major river 
systems and the atmosphere) (Paterson, 2013). This, in turn, has grown to cover a broader 
spectrum of topics, such as climate change, the thinning of the ozone layer, erosion of 
biodiversity, emergence of other uniquely global ecological problems, and global ecological 
economic interdependence (Paterson, 2013).  
 
“Just as feminist discourses from outside the discipline of IR have exposed the gender blindness 
of much IR theory, green IR theory, drawing on more radical green discourses from outside the 
discipline of IR theory, has helped to expose what might be called the ecological blindness of IR 
theory” (Eckersley, 2013:267). Evolving from critiques of mainstream theoretical approaches 
like structural or neo-realism, and neoliberalism, the theory has critically revised and extended 
on neo-Marxism’s concept of international political economy, and normative IR theories of a 
cosmopolitan orientation (Vogler, 2011). 
 
The modern ecological crisis occurred towards the end of the twentieth century. Specifically, 
the 1960s were marked by the birth of environment movements, as after the World War II, 
“rapid economic growth, the proliferation of new technologies, and rising population in this 
period generated increasing energy and resource consumption, new sources (and rising levels) 
of pollution and waste production, and the rapid erosion of the earth’s biodiversity” (Eckersley, 
2013: 268). Towards the end of the 20th Century, the global environmental assessment 
remained unfavourable and incomplete, even though some environmental indicators had 
improved in some countries. As per the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that was completed in March 2005, 60% of the ecosystem 
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services studied were either being degraded at a rapid speed or used unsustainably 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: 1).  
 
By the 1980s, a green social and political theory had emerged that explained interrelated 
concerns, such as the environment, peace, anti-nuclear, and women’s rights among others. It 
not only formed the bases of new green parties, but also shaped green politics at the local, 
national and regional levels. Green IPE is based on four pillars; namely, ecological responsibility, 
grass-roots democracy, non-violence, and social justice (Vogler, 2011). “Green politics is the 
only new global political discourse and practice to emerge in opposition to neoliberal 
globalization” (Eckersley, 2013: 269). 
 
Green IPE had gained much recognition by the 1990s as a new political tradition that the most 
decisive influence on theories, like liberalism and socialism. Similar to liberalism and socialism, 
green IPE has a normative branch and a political economy branch. The normative branch 
focuses on questions of justice, rights, democracy, citizenship, the state, and the environment; 
whereas, the political economy branch focuses on understanding the relationship between the 
state, the economy and the environment (Vogler, 2011). 
 
The emergence of the theory till the end of the 20th century marked the first wave of green 
political theory, and it highlighted the ecological irrationality of key social institutions. The 
second wave of the theory highlights critical thinking (and in some cases, rethinking), and 
transnationalising the scope of many core political concepts and institutions with keeping 
environmental problems in mind (Steans, Pettiford & Diez, 2005). The first wave was able to 
create a critique of industrialism that broadly re-examined the ideas surrounding the progress 
of modernization through enlightenment. The theory has pointed out the ecological, social and 
psychological costs of the modernization process. “They have criticized humanity’s increasingly 
instrumental relationship with non-human nature, along with the subjugation of indigenous 
peoples and many traditional forms of agriculture” (Eckersley, 2013: 269). The theory has done 
so by rejecting anthropocentrism (regarding humankind as the central or most important 
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element of existence) and seeks to accept and respect all forms of life, not only those that are 
of instrumental value to humans (Steans, Pettiford & Diez, 2005).  
 
The second wave was concerned with exploring the relationship between environmental justice 
and environmental democracy. According to the theory environmental injustices arise “when 
unaccountable social agents ‘externalize’ the environmental costs of their decisions and 
practices to innocent third parties – particularly vulnerable communities in the Global South – 
in circumstances where the affected parties (or their representatives) have no knowledge of, or 
input in, the ecological risk-generating decisions and practices” (Eckersley, 2013: 271). It can 
also occur when developed or first-world countries create a rather large ecological footprint. 
Therefore, the mission of the theory is to reduce the ecological risks and prevent unequal 
externalisation and displacement on the innocent third parties (Steans, Pettiford & Diez, 2005).  
 
It is then to be noted that in order to ensure environmental justice, five key steps need to be 
taken (Paterson, 2013). The first being that there needs to be mutual recognition of the 
community being affected by ecological risks. The second is that the citizens affected by the 
ecological risks need to participate and critically deliberate all environmental decision-making; 
which includes policy-making, legislating, treaty-making, administration, monitoring 
enforcement, and adjudication. The third is that a precautionary approach needs to be taken to 
ensure that the risks are minimised. The fourth, the risks are fairly distributed that are 
reflectively acceptable via the democratic process and includes the stance of the affected 
parties. And the fifth step is compensation for the affected parties (Paterson, 2013).  
 
As it is already known, neorealism and neoliberalism are the two dominant rationalist theories 
that have approached environmental issues as a new area that is engaged into their already 
existing theoretical frameworks, rather than addressing it as a new normative challenging 
concept. The political and normative branch of the theory has critiqued these rationalist 
approaches on four levels. Firstly, the normative purposes served by the rationalist theories 
implicitly expose the environmental assumptions, problems and ethical values (Eckersley, 2013: 
274). On the second level, the analytical frameworks and explanatory powers of the rationalist 
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– as well as the positivist – theories (for example: neoliberalists predict that inter-state 
environmental cooperation is highly unlikely unless it can be coerced by a hegemonic state, and 
that such cooperation will always remain vulnerable to shifts in the distribution of power) 
(Eckersley, 2013: 275).  
 
Thirdly, according to the discussed theory, critical attention has been focused on “the social 
agents and social structures that have systematically blocked the negotiation of more 
ecologically enlightened regimes. These critical analyses have been applied not only to 
ineffective regimes, but also to the relationship between overlapping regimes and to global 
governance structures in general” (Eckersley, 2013: 276). And finally, the theory has explored a 
wide range of role of non-state forms of deterritorialised governance, ranging from transitional 
initiatives of environmental NGOs to private governance practices of industrial and financial 
corporations (Eckersley, 2013: 276).  
 
As GIPE has its roots embedded in neoliberalism, which is the idea of a convergence of the 
liberal desire to expand and intensify market forces and environmentally sustainable 
development for the global South. “The phrase was coined by sociologist Michael Goldman to 
help explain how these two seemingly conflicting projects/ideologies have become 
institutionalized by global governing institutions, particularly – but not limited to – the World 
Bank. The implementation of green neoliberal strategies has led to “environmental states” that 
open themselves to market forces and the (self-) governance of subjects along neoliberal lines. 
Although still relatively new, the phrase has been applied to new areas of global environmental 
governance, including investigations of the Montreal Protocol” (Gareau, 2011). 
 
In an additional subtheme of green IPE, the anthropocentric view from the perspective of 
environmental justice, ecological systems are at the centre of all value, and that human systems 
are embedded in and mirror ecological systems. Contrary to this, anthropocentric view – as 
mentioned above – places human systems above or outside ecological systems and considers it 
a source of all value. Ecological systems are considered to be of only instrumental, aesthetic, or 
utilitarian value.  
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2.2) Connecting Green IPE and Neo-Gramscian Theory 
 
An easy way of understanding the complex theoretical neo-Gramscian construction is through 
the concept of hegemony. According to the neo-realist hegemonic stability theory, 
international order may exist provided it rests on one powerful state, which dominates all other 
states through its superiority in military and economic capabilities (Bieler & Morton, 2003). In 
contrast, the neo-Gramscian perspective that was developed by Robert Cox broadens the 
domain of hegemony, emphasising that it becomes more than simply state dominance (Bieler & 
Morton, 2003). A scenario for hegemony may exist within a world order “based on a coherent 
conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of 
world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with 
a certain semblance of universality” (Cox, 1981:139). Therefore, hegemony can be seen as a 
form of dominance, but it refers more to a consensual order so that “dominance by a powerful 
state may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony” (Cox, 1981: 139). (Bieler 
& Morton, 2003). 
 
Within a historical structure, hegemony is constituted through three spheres of activity. The 
first sphere is that the social relations of production are the starting point for analysing the 
operations and mechanisms of hegemony (Cox, 1987: 1-9). In this context, production is 
understood in a broad sense and “covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of 
the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical 
goods” (Cox 1989: 39). These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations of 
production, which engender social forces as the most important collective actors (Bieler & 
Morton, 2003). By discerning the different modes of social relations of production, it is possible 
to consider how changing production relations gives rise to particular social forces that become 
the bases of power within and across states, as well as within a specific world order (Cox, 1987: 
4). The wider understanding of production provides assurance that social forces are not 
reduced to material aspects. As Cox mentions: “‘Non-class’ issues – peace, ecology, and 
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feminism – are not to be set aside but given a firm and conscious basis in the social realities 
shaped through the production process” (Cox, 1987: 353). 
 
The second sphere of activity is the forms of state. State power rests on the underlying 
structures of social forces. Therefore, rather than taking the state as a given or pre-constituted 
institutional category, consideration is given to the historical construction of various forms of 
state and the social context of political struggle. This is accomplished by drawing upon the 
concept of a historical bloc (the way in which leading social forces within a specific national 
context establish a relationship over contending social forces) and by widening the theory of 
the state to include relations within civil society (Bieler & Morton, 2003). It is more than simply 
just a political alliance between social forces represented by classes or groups of classes (Bieler 
& Morton, 2003). According to Gramsci (Hoare & Smith, 1971: 181-182), it indicates the 
integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society 
“bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral 
unity on a ‘universal’ plane”. Different forms of state are considered as the expression of 
particular historical blocs. Furthermore, for Gramsci, the state should be understood not just as 
an apparatus of the government operating within the ‘public’ sphere (government, political 
parties, military) but also as part of the ‘private’ sphere of civil society (church, media, 
education) through which hegemony functions (Hoare & Smith, 1971: 261). “It can therefore be 
argued that the state in this conception is understood as a social relation. The state is not 
unquestioningly taken as a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a 
form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed” (Bieler & 
Morton, 2003). 
 
The third sphere of activity is that world orders not only represent phases of stability and 
conflict but also permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms of world order might 
emerge (Cox, 1981: 135-8). Creating a historical bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social 
class and is therefore a national phenomenon (Cox, 1983: 168, 174). Yet once consolidated 
domestically, hegemony may expand beyond a particular social order to move outward on a 
world scale through the international expansion of a particular mode of social relations of 
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production, which can further be supported by mechanisms of international organisation (Cox, 
1983: 171 & Cox, 1987: 149-150).  
 
It is to be noted that “within each of the three main spheres it is argued that three further 
elements reciprocally combine to constitute an historical structure: ideas, understood as 
intersubjective meanings as well as collective images of world order; material capabilities, 
referring to accumulated resources; and institutions, which are amalgams of the previous two 
elements and are means of stabilising a particular order” (Bieler & Morton, 2003). Over time, 
the main aim is to break down the coherent historical structures that consist of different 
patterns of social relations of production, forms of state and world order; and has existed 
within the capitalist mode of production (Cox, 1987: 396-8). As social forces operate within and 
across all spheres of activity, through the rise of contending social forces, linked to changes in 
production, there may occur mutually reinforcing transformations in forms of state and world 
order (Bieler & Morton, 2003).  
 
The expansive collection of neo-Gramscian work shares a common commitment to social 
change. As Stephen Gill has argued, the Gramscian approach differs from the prevailing 
orthodoxy in that it “insists upon an ethical dimension to analysis” in stark contrast to the 
concerns of political order and the pragmatic need for systems management that dominate the 
orthodoxy (Ayers, 2013: 3). “Neo-Gramscian theorists have argued for a conception of history 
as dialectical, seeking to highlight the internal contradictions of prevailing social relations that 
might form the basis for progressive social change” (Ayers, 2013: 3). They further challenge the 
widespread tendency that occurs within orthodox IR/IPE theories “to use transhistorical 
theorisations based upon sets of a priori categories which appear to take on an ontological 
autonomy” (Ayers, 2013: 3). Although, orthodox theoretical approaches may be practically 
adequate (meaning being socially effective in that they inform the construction of the social 
world and certain policy initiatives at any moment), but they fail at providing an adequate 
scientific explanation (Ayers, 2013: 3). 
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The international system is to be understood as an articulation of three spheres of activity to 
which the ‘method’ of historical structures is then applied. The spheres of activity are: social 
forces (particularly those engendered through the production process); the forms of states (that 
are derived from analysis of state-society complexes); and world orders (that are understood as 
particular configurations of forces that define relations between the ensemble of states) (Ayers, 
2013: 3-4). In contrast with the privileging of state power and dominance within realist IR 
theory, relative stability, known as hegemony, arises from “a coherent conjunction or fit 
between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order 
(including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain 
semblance of universality” (Ayers, 2013: 3-4). The explanation of how and why this fit occurs 
and unravels is said to lie in the realm of social forces shaped by production relations, provided 
through a political-economy perspective of the world (Ayers, 2013: 3-4). 
 
The hallmark of neo-Gramscian IR/IPE, the concept of hegemony is said to provide the means to 
overcome structural determinism by taking practices of ideology and subjectivity as causal 
within the production and reproduction of world order. The combinations of the two theoretical 
perspectives were important for the research as GIPE fails to understand the structure and 
agency dynamics of change, among others. Thus this is where the Neo-Gramscian approach is 
able to explain the social forces that are shaping the issue of fracking. 
 
2.3) Climate Justice 
 
The term climate justice is usually used to frame the subject of global warming as an ethical and 
political issue rather than one that is purely environmental or physical in nature (Huntjens & 
Zhang, 2016). Furthermore, it occasionally refers to actual legal action taken on climate change 
issues. This is done by relating the effects of climate change to concepts of justice, particularly 
environmental justice and social justice and by examining issues such as equality, human rights, 
collective rights and the responsibilities for and against climate change (Huntjens & Zhang, 
2016). A fundamental proposition of climate justice is that those who are least responsible for 
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climate change suffer its gravest consequences (Koch, 2011), as shown in the film based on the 
book, This Changes Everything, by Naomi Klein.  
 
The ability of populations to mitigate and adapt to the negative consequences of climate 
change are shaped by factors such as income, race, class, gender, capital and political 
representation. As low-income communities and communities of colour possess few if any 
adaptive resources, they are particularly vulnerable to climate change (Mohai, Pellow & 
Roberts, 2009). People living in poverty or in precarious circumstances tend to have neither the 
resources nor the insurance cover necessary to bounce back from environmental disasters. On 
top of that, such populations often receive an unequal share of disaster relief and recovery 
assistance (Mohai, Pellow & Roberts, 2009).  
 
Much of the education available on how to tackle climate change has been primarily focused on 
individual and household actions, however without any structural and systemic changes, they 
are limited on how to lower their greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the main industries and 
infrastructure need to be re-examined as a political and collective one (Klein, 2012: 9). 
Furthermore, one of the central challenges for climate mobilization efforts relates to the need 
to integrate calls for individual action within their wider structural contexts. Such integration 
must consider how to galvanize both personal ‘green behaviour’ and collective action in 
support of public policy changes that can enhance quality of life and reduce GHG emissions 
(Klein, 2012: 9). Issues of fairness and justice must also be effectively addressed in the design of 
climate mitigation policies (Klein, 2012: 9). 
 
Confronting the climate crisis represents a new industrial revolution as the global trade regime 
fuels the extraction and use of coal and, from a climate justice perspective, constitutes one of 
the main causes for the emissions increase and, in consequence, for the current climate crisis 
(Edenhofer, Luderer, Flachsland & Füssel, 2008). Embracing climate justice means developing 
industrial and employment strategies for all sectors of the economy (Edenhofer, Luderer, 
Flachsland & Füssel, 2008). The challenge is to focus on what matters – reducing inequality, 
enhancing the quality of life, ending poverty, low unemployment and good jobs, hard caps on 
Bulbul Shrivastava  433959 
USA’s Policies on Fracking  University of the Witwatersrand 
Page 21 of 126 
 
GHG emissions that lower steadily over time, and limitations on the extraction of natural 
resources to ensure sustainability and protect biodiversity. Perhaps the result will be slow or 
even result in zero GDP growth in the short term (Edenhofer, Luderer, Flachsland & Füssel, 
2008).  Governments should no longer be judged on the basis of the GDP record under their 
watch, but rather, on the basis of how well they accomplish the higher-order tasks (Edenhofer, 
Luderer, Flachsland & Füssel, 2008). Clearly, there is an ecological imperative with which 
progressive economists must fulsomely grapple. Ecological limits necessitate that a drop in 
material throughput, waste and emissions. But this may or may not necessarily result in a drop 
in GDP (Edenhofer, Luderer, Flachsland & Füssel, 2008). 
 
If the climate policies are not perceived as being fair, sustainable public support will not be 
gained, leading to a decline in political will and determination (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). In turn, poverty and inequality will be exacerbated by 
climate policy unless the action is explicitly taken into account (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). Almost all climate policies implemented have the effect of 
increasing prices, with a regressive distributional impact (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). This is not a reason to not proceed; but rather, it means that 
redistribution measures – both domestically and globally – must be core to climate action 
agendas. The focus of climate policy and communications ought rightly to be on structural 
changes, through the lens of equity, and on building a vibrant movement and collective action 
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008).  
 
The link between green IPE and climate justice is that climate change initiatives and governance 
approaches have tended to be driven from the global scale. While the development of 
international agreements has witnessed a progressive step of global political action, the 
governance of climate change issue may be unable to provide adequate flexibility for specific 
national conditions (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Besides, from the development perspective of 
view, the issue of equity and global environmental justice would require a fair international 
regime within which the impact of climate change and poverty could be simultaneously 
prevented. In this context, climate change is not only a global crisis that needs the presence of 
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international politics, but also a challenge for national governments (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). 
The understanding of the political economy of climate change could explain the formulation 
and translation of international initiatives to specific national policy context, which provides an 
important perspective to tackle climate change and achieve climate justice (Tanner & Allouche, 
2011).  
 
In addition, there have been a number of developments of financing mechanisms in the area of 
climate change. On the basis of equity and climate justice, climate change resource flows are 
increasingly called on developed world according to the culpability for damages (Tanner & 
Allouche, 2011). As a result, it is inevitable to change the governance structures so as for 
developing countries to break the traditional donor-recipient relationships. Within these 
contexts, the understanding of the political economy processes of financial flows in climate 
change arena would be crucial to effectively govern the resource transfer and to tackle the 
climate change (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). 
 
Some of the climate justice organisations that exist in the USA are: Indigenous Peoples 
Movements, Environmental Justice Communities and Coalitions, 350.org, Right to the City 
Alliance, Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, Just Transition Alliance, Greenpeace. Regarding the 
strength of the climate justice movement in the USA, some companies are able to seep through 
to the government, whereas some are not able to. Nonetheless, many citizens are able to see 
the effects of fracking in their surroundings (such as the lack of water supply and the storage of 




“Though basic fracking techniques have been available for decades, technological 
breakthroughs in the 1990s paved the way for newfound commercial viability in the shale 
sector” (McBride & Sergie, 2015). According to the US Energy Information Administration, net 
imports had decreased by a third between 2011 and 2013, and by 2014, foreign petroleum 
imports had dropped by 40% (McBride & Sergie, 2015). The 2014 outlook report showed that 
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natural gas reserves (a group of resources that have been established to be economical to 
extract under present conditions) increased by 10% in 2013 to 354 trillion cubic feet, while the 
more inclusive measure of ‘technically recoverable reserves’ amounted to a tenth of the global 
supply, which is over 600 trillion cubic feet (McBride & Sergie, 2015). EIA projects shale gas 
production to continue rising until 2040, however making such projects are dependent on 
factors such as the viability of deposits, “the future of energy prices, global demand, and 
technological developments” (McBride & Sergie, 2015). 
 
The impact of fracking on climate change can be debated, particularly relating to the amount of 
methane released by the process. A study conducted in 2013 (Allen, Torres, Thomas, Sullivan, 
Harrison, Hendler, Herndoc, Kolb, Fraser, Hill, Lamb, Miskimins, Sawyer & Seinfeldi, 2013) found 
that the volume of escaped methane gas through fracking was lower than government 
estimates. Contrary to this, a study conducted in 2014 (Schneising, Burrows, Dickerson, 
Buchwitz, Reuter & Bovensmann, 2014), found that the amount of methane gas produced may 
be higher than expected and previously thought.  
 
The combined emissions associated with extraction, combustion, and methane and carbon 
dioxide releases, suggests that fracked gas can be as dirty as coal. Fracking releases large 
amounts of natural gas directly into the atmosphere. In fact, fracking wells leak 40% to 60% 
more methane than conventional natural gas wells. This occurs when water is forced down into 
a fracking well to fracture the rock formations. Methane flows up the well and is released into 
the atmosphere before it can be captured. The leaked methane is called “fugitive methane” 
and has been detected using infrared videos. It is identified as different from naturally 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
A single case study of the US was chosen for the paper. The reason for this is because it has 
become the second-largest oil producer in the world under Obama’s first term as president. 
Furthermore, the number of shale gas shafts have drastically increased as well, which has 
impacted the climate. 
 
As the study only focused on the case of the USA, process-tracing was used. Process-tracing was 
used due to the study only focusing on the case of the USA. Process-tracing is a mode of causal 
inference based on concatenation.  By relying on within-case analysis, process tracing privileges 
internal validity over external validity; in return for this constraint on generality, process-tracing 
has the potential to generate relatively complex explanations (Walder, 2012:67).  Process-
tracing provides micro-level evidence that decisions made by the USA directly influenced the 
environmental policy decisions globally. In this study, the method was firstly used for looking at 
the process of fracking, followed by its regulatory policies. Thereafter, USA’s foreign policies 
surrounding energy and climate change during Bush’s and Obama’s administration.  
 
The primary objective of the research was to trace the successes and failures of the Kyoto 
Protocol to draw up a list of lessons learnt, which was achieved through an extensive review of 
existing literature on Climate Change and Green IPE. These lessons were then applied to the 
proposed 2015 Paris agreement, which is currently being ratified by member countries of the 
UNFCC, to critically analyze the possibilities of successes and failure in reducing global 
greenhouse emissions.  
 
The secondary focus of the research, the paper examined the role of the US in the success of a 
global environmental treaty. For this purpose, the paper examined regulatory policies related 
to the fracking industry in the US; it outlined the growth of fracking in the US oil and gas sector 
in the past decade; the impact of fracking on oil supply domestically and globally; and the 
potential impact of these trends on global emission targets. 
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As the research report aims to look at the rise of fracking in the USA and the impact the activity 
has had on the USA’s foreign policy towards climate change, green IPE was chosen as it defies 
the Anthropocene approach hence is not concerned with the effects on the environment. 
However, as it can be noted the Obama Administration was attempting to shift toward policies 
that emit less greenhouse gases and will preserve the environment.  
 
As information was retrieved using process-tracing primarily from books, journal articles 
written in the past decade, and newspaper articles. In addition, reports by the International 
Energy Agency (World Energy Outlook Special Report on Energy and Climate Change, and the 
World Energy Outlook series); the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Overview, Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, Annual Energy Review 
reports), United Nations Environmental Programme Reports (Gas fracking); and US 
Environmental Protection Agency was looked at. Information was also sourced from the 
website of the US Department of Energy. Important sources of information were books written 
by Timothy Mitchell (Carbon Democracy); Naomi Klein (This Changes Everything); Michael Klare 
(The Race for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources); and Andrew 
McKillop and Sheila Newman (The Final Energy Crisis). 
 
Some of the challenges faced during the research and write-up of the paper were that some 
journal and newspaper articles were not easily accessible due to security reasons, such that 
access to these articles was not permitted to everyone. Another challenge was that of finding 
an electronic version of the books, as the ordering a hard copy online was not feasible due to 
time constraints. Also, the platforms that the hard copy version of the books were available on 
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Chapter 4: USA’s Fossil Fuel Industry and Fracking 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief historical background to the USA’s fossil fuel 
industry and how the fracking process (and industry) continued to increasingly dominate USA’s 
fossil fuel industry. This will be achieved by explaining what fracking is, discuss its advantages 
and disadvantages, why it is surrounded by controversy, and the water storage issue. Related to 
the paper’s theory and literature review, the chapter primarily relates to Green IPE in general. 
 
4.1) Historical background to USA’s Fossil Fuel Industry: From Coal to Petroleum to the 
current state 
 
Fossil fuels can be defined as the organic matter that is made from the remains of flora and 
fauna, which are subjected to immense pressure and heat deep within the Earth over millions 
of years (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016). Petroleum, coal, and natural gas are major fossil 
fuels (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016). The Federal Government of the US’s involvement in 
fossil fuel resources began in the early 1900s (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016).  
 
Surface coal mining and household usage of coal can be dated back to 3490 BC, China. Small 
mining operations began to spread throughout Europe during the Middle Ages to supply forges, 
smithies, and breweries. In the 1400s, when the British were running out of firewood to burn, 
the invention of fire bricks made chimneys cheap to build. Thus, the market for coal was 
created. (Moore, 2016). 
 
As the availability of coal decreased, coal miners began digging beneath the Earth’s surface, 
thereby creating coal mines. These coal mines, once dug out, were filled with water. Thomas 
Newcomen created a steam engine – known as the Newcomen steam engine – in 1712 that 
pumped water out of coal mines, combining the previous efforts of Thomas Savery and Denis 
Papin. Even though there were a number of the Newcomen steam engines that were 
constructed throughout the 18th Century, the engine also required a large amount of energy to 
repeatedly cool and reheat the cylinder. James Watt improved the power and cost-efficiency, 
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as well as approximately doubling the fuel efficiency of the steam engine by adding a separate 
condenser. Invention and finding a way to use fossil fuels for energy purposes is what led to the 
Industrial Revolution. (Moore, 2016). 
 
As the Industrial Revolution spread to the United States during the first half of the 1800s, the 
use of coal became more widespread. It replaced low-energy firewood and became the leading 
source to power steam locomotives and machinery. “Rails and steam engines combined to 
build railroads, furthering the need for coal. It didn’t take long for utility companies to discover 
they could burn coal to generate electricity and charge consumers for it.” (Moore, 2016). 
 
The development of drilling technology in the mid-1800s led to mass-consumption of 
petroleum as a fuel (Moore, 2016). Edwin Drake drilled the first rock oil well in Pennsylvania in 
1859, thereby replacing whale oil in lighting (Moore, 2016). The invention of the first high-
speed automobile engine by Gottlieb Daimler further pushed the use of petroleum into a place 
of prominence in the early 1900s (Moore, 2016). Energy has always been a major concern for 
the government (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). It had not even been 50 years to the birth 
of the nation's oil industry, when the federal government’s leaders were already worried about 
an impending oil shortage. By 1909, the Navy had converted from powering their ships with 
sails and coal to ‘black oil’ (that is, unrefined crude oil) (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2016). However, the uncertainty surrounding the long-term future of oil supplies in the United 
States was still of great concern. 
 
As many of the nation's large oil fields had not yet been discovered, therefore in order “to 
ensure sufficient fuel for the fleet, the Government began withdrawing probable oil-bearing 
lands from the public domain” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). Between 1909 and 1924, 
various areas in California, Utah, and Wyoming were set aside, and were known as the Naval 
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves. These reserves are the oldest component of the current 
Fossil Energy organisation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). By 1916 the center of the nation's 
oil activity had shifted westward. The U.S. Bureau of Mines, which was established in 1910 in 
the Department of the Interior, saw the need to learn more about oil extraction methods and 
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thus began the search for a place to locate a petroleum experiment station, Oklahoma. In 1917, 
large oil reserves were found in the Osage Indian Nation. This confirmed that the nation’s oil 
industry hub was indeed firmly implanted in the Midwest. The government’s petroleum 
research program was initiated when the Bartlesville experiment station opened in 1918 (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2016). 
 
During the Great Depression, fossil fuels usage increased; especially the use of coal, tar, and oil, 
as these were being turned into industrial chemicals (Moore, 2016). With the Wright Brothers 
initiating oil-fueled aviation, fertilizer and oil-powered tractors were also being invented 
(Moore, 2016). The use of fossil fuels continued to grow until 1929, to the extent that there was 
an overproduction. When the severe worldwide economic collapse began, consumerism was 
invented to soak up all the excess (Moore, 2016). 
 
During World War II, oil could be seen as the primary reason for the USA’s – as well as Japan’s 
and Germany’s – interests and actions (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). For Japan, the 
prospects of finding large oil reserves in Indonesia was for them an attempt to conquer 
Southeast Asia (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). Similarly, in Germany, the lack of oil supply 
but abundant reserves of coal supply led its war machines to develop synthetic substitutes for 
petroleum (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). German scientists then developed technological 
ways to change these abundant coal supplies into liquid fuels, typically using high-pressure 
'brute-force' processes (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
 
As the US also possessed abundant reserves of coal supply, it showed interest in the German 
technological advancements towards the latter stages of the war, when the scientists and 
technical documents were captured. Therefore, in case the US’s natural oil supplies begin to 
decline, the Federal Government began investigating possible coal-based synthetic alternatives. 
“The Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944 began the first concentrated effort to study future ways 
to use the Nation's abundant coal supplies” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
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When many of the OPEC (Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries) member states 
temporarily ceased the oil shipments to the USA in 1973, and by doing so causing a sharp spike 
in world oil prices, US policymakers realised that energy and security of oil was no longer a 
matter that should be taken lightly (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). The Energy 
Reorganisation Act of 1974 created two new agencies: The Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The ERDA was mandated to 
carry out a more energy-aggressive development program, as well as oversee the Nation's 
nuclear weapons and naval reactor programs. Whereas the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
was created to regulate the nuclear power industry. (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
 
The abovementioned oil embargo of 1973 not only led to the reorganisation of federal energy 
functions, but it also allowed the government to pay attention to the need for an emergency 
stockpile of crude oil. “Unlike the federal oil tracts set aside in the early part of the century, the 
government needed a reserve that could pump emergency oil into the market much faster than 
any oil field. Such a stockpile of crude oil had been discussed in the Eisenhower Administration 
but never implemented” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). However, due to the oil shortage, 
President Gerald Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act on 22 December 1975. 
This in turn, allowed an extension of oil price controls, authorising the creation of an emergency 
oil reserve. This has resulted in today's Fossil Energy organisation, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
 
The USA experienced more energy shocks from there onwards. A shortage of natural gas in the 
most severe winter of 1977, caused many factories and schools to close, together with the 
threat of a cut-off of supply to residential customers (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). 
Meanwhile, as the unrest in the Middle East grew due to the region being the world’s dominant 
supplier of crude oil, Islamic fundamentalism was on the rise in Iran and elsewhere, and within 
two years, the Shah of Iran (one of the world's most prolific exporters of crude oil) was 
overthrown (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016).  
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The U.S. Department of Energy was activated in October 1977 and was mandated to focus on 
federal energy programs. “In the original Energy Department organisation, Fossil Energy 
programmes were managed as a division under the Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology. 
On October 1, 1979, many of the Department's energy research functions were recognised, and 
the Fossil Energy program was elevated to its current Assistant Secretary-level status” (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2016). 
 
In his book, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, Timothy Mitchell (2011) 
challenges the widespread view that political systems are primarily shaped by attitudes and 
ideas. He explains how the development of the coal industry, and the dependence on the 
energy derived from coal, enabled a novel democratization of politics (Bagic, 2014). Coal miners 
and other workers were able to make their demands heard and attended to because they were 
in a position to have effects on the flow of energy, which, in numerous ways, could be 
interrupted (Mitchell, 2011). The subsequent turn to oil was in response to this 
democratization. First, oil was pursued as a successor to coal, in part to disable workers' 
existing power with respect to coal (Mitchell, 2011). Second, it was physically organized in such 
a fashion as to make interruptions more difficult (Mitchell, 2011).  
 
Governments and the elite as a response to the threat of the strikes looked to other energy 
sources, particularly oil (Mitchell, 2011). Compared to coal which is highly concentrated, 
hard to transport, oil is less centralised, international, requires less workers and can be pumped 
and transported easier. There are less points of vulnerability for strikes with oil than with coal. 
The vulnerability is also lower with oil because there are two alternatives: coal and oil. Using oil 
worked to de-democratise the system (Mitchell, 2011).  
 
Oil companies are vulnerable to competition from other companies globally. This is because oil 
is easy to transport. The same happened locally with coal. In order to overcome the problem of 
competition with coal, coal companies entered into a cartel agreement with neighbouring 
mines to fix the coal price. The oil companies wanted to do the same thing, and hence 
organised cartels, forming monopolies of greater scales, and in turn resulting in the large 
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multinational oil companies. These multinational oil companies brought up oil exploration 
rights to limit supply in order to keep prices high. They also deliberately did not pump oil to 
maintain high prices and high profits. The major Western oil companies worked to keep the 
Soviet Union, which had large oil reserves, out of the world oil market to limit supply. The other 
way of maintaining high oil prices was to increase consumption. For example, motorcars with 
large engines. Oil companies brought up public transport companies that used electric trams 
and putting them out of business. (Mitchell, 2011). 
 
Mitchell primarily emphasised that it was the socio-technical systems erected around carbon 
(rather than the resource itself) which permitted this agency (Mitchell, 2011:42). He thus 
contributes to a growing literature on 'technopolitics' – recently defined as ‘the strategic 
practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals’ – which examines how power 
can be derived from the control of technical knowledge and practices (Mitchell, 2011). 
 
The collapse of the post-1945 system placed the weakened carbon democracies of the West 
into a new relationship with the oil states of the Middle East, while motivating the political right 
to promote the ‘market’ as an alternative technology of rule. Mitchell's relative straightforward 
account of how the vulnerabilities of coal production related to democratic claims is heavily 
contrasted with the complex networks of oil, as the post-crisis ‘neoliberal laws of market’ also 
weakened the powers of labour by further ‘placing parts of the world beyond the reach of 
democratic contestation’ (Mitchell, 2011:173).  
 
4.2) About Fracking 
 
4.2.1) What is Fracking? 
 
Hydraulic fracturing, which is more commonly known as fracking, is “a technology that is used 
to enhance the flow of energy from a well once the drilling is done and the rig and derrick are 
removed from the scene” (Energy In Depth, 2016). It is a technique that accesses the oil in shale 
and other tight-rock formations by drilling approximately a mile or more below the surface of 
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the earth and then gradually turning to drill horizontal which allows to continue the drilling 
process to continue several feet below. This also allows for a number of fracking wells to be 
created at a single fracking sight. Once the drill has been cemented, small perforations are 
made to the area of the well where it was horizontally drilled into. The perforation mixture 
(also known as fracking fluid) is comprised of 90% water, 9.5% sand and 0.5% additives.  
 
It is pumped at high pressures to create micro-fractures in the rock that are held open by the 
grains of sand (EnergyFromShale.org, 2016), thus the name hydraulic fracturing. “Additives play 
a number of roles, including helping to reduce friction (thereby reducing the amount of 
pumping pressure from diesel-powered sources, which reduces air emissions) and prevent pipe 
corrosion, which in turn help protect the environment and boost well efficiency” 
(EnergyFromShale.org, 2016). The process, on average, takes about three to five days to 
complete from start to finish. “Once the fracturing operation is done, the well is considered to 
be ‘completed’, and is now ready to produce oil and/or natural gas for years, even decades, to 




Fracking can be traced back to the battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, which lasted for 4 days 
from 11 to 15 December 1862. During the battle civil war veteran Col. Edward A.L. Roberts 
experimented with the idea of firing explosive artillery into a narrow canal that clogged the 
battlefield. The process was described as superincumbent fluid tamping. In April 1865, Col. 
Roberts received his first patent to improve the process, which was followed by him being 
awarded the patent, numbered 59 936 and known as ‘Exploding Torpedo’ (Manfreda, 2015). 
“This extraction method was implemented by packing a torpedo in an iron case that contained 
15-20 pounds of powder. The case was then lowered into the oil well, at a spot closest to the 
oil. From there, they would explode the torpedo by connecting the top of the shell with wire to 
the surface, and then filling the borehole with water” (Manfreda, 2015). Within a week of the 
implementation of the new patent, oil production in the USA increased by 1200%, which in turn 
led to Col. Roberts finding the Roberts Petroleum Torpedo Company. The company charged 
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US$100 - US$200 per rocket, with an additional royalty of a fifteenth of the profits generated 
from the product (Manfreda, 2015). 
 
Fracking innovation only began in the 1930s when workers used acid, a substitute of non-
explosive liquid, instead of nitroglycerin. This marked the introduction of modern day fracking 
as it is known today (Manfreda, 2015). An experiment carried out in 1947 by Floyd Farris 
studied the relationship between oil and gas production output, and the amount of pressurised 
treatment being used on each well. The experiment was not successful in determining a 
positive relationship as it injected gelled gasoline and sand into a gas-producing limestone 
formation 2 400 feet deep which was followed by a gel breaker. As further experiments were 
conducted, and positive results were gradually shown, fracking quickly became commercialised 
(Manfreda, 2015). In his 1975 State of the Union speech and as part of his overall energy plan, 
President Gerald Ford promoted the development of shale oil resources as a means of reducing 
foreign oil imports. The process of fracking as it is known today, only began in the 1990s by 
businessman, George P. Mitchell when he combined horizontal drilling with hydraulic fracturing 
(Manfreda, 2015).  
 
4.2.3) Advantages and Disadvantages to Fracking 
 
“Ask the most hardcore of pro-fracking boosters for their take, and they’ll describe the modern 
miracle of America’s new-found energy independence, a reality almost inconceivable just a 
decade ago. For them, the oil and gas boom around the U.S. has helped to reboot the economy 
at a time of great need. Prices at the pump have plummeted. Sure, they may acknowledge, 
there are a few safety issues to be worked out and techniques yet to be perfected, but just look 
at the big picture” (Wihbey, 2015). 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of fracking can be produced under five key issues. The first 
issue is that fracking is changing the USA’s role in the energy segment and this has 
consequences on the air quality, health and the energy policies (Wihbey, 2015). The advantage 
of this is that as the dependence from coal shifts to natural gas for electricity generation, 
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natural gas emits less harmful particles in the air. In 2008, coal made up 50% of the USA’s 
electricity generation, which then decreased to 37% by 2012. During the same period, natural 
gas increased from 20% to 30%. The shift also shows the reduction in nitrogen oxide and 
sulphur dioxide emissions (Wihbey, 2015).  
 
The disadvantages to this are that firstly, a new natural gas facility will displace coal. Therefore, 
fracking is no sure guarantee for the improvement of regional air quality. Secondly, due to the 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) released during the gas drilling process being extremely 
toxic, the dynamics of air quality concerning around fracking operations are not fully 
understood, and the cumulative health impacts of fracking for residents near fracking sites and 
workers are largely negative (Physicians for Social Responsibility, 2016). Thirdly, natural gas 
cannot be regarded as a clean and renewable source of energy production, and thus it cannot 
be seen as the answer to truly cleaning up the air. It could however, put a much-needed and 
well-thought transition to wind, solar, geothermal, and other sources that produce fewer or no 
harmful airborne fine particulates (Wihbey, 2015). 
 
The second key issue is that the extraction method results in the leakage of greenhouse gases. 
The advantage to this is that natural gas produced at the power plant level, is approximately 
between 44% and 50% of the greenhouse gas emissions compared to burning of coal. Research 
conducted by Howarth, Santoro and Ingraffea (2011) claims that methane over a use of 20 
years can be harmful; but over a 100-year timeline – which is generally the time period used to 
measure global warming potential – methane is not nearly as harmful as claimed. Thus, 
methane’s impact is potent but relatively brief compared with impacts of increased carbon 
dioxide emissions. A larger threat to the atmosphere currently is reliance on coal, and priority 
must be placed on reducing this reliance (Howarth, Santoro & Ingraffea, 2011). Technology 
development is underway to report accurate emission leakage rates and further narrow the 
gap. Moreover, research-based modelling suggests that even if energy consumption increases 
overall, the United States still will reap greenhouse benefits as a result of fracking (Newell & 
Raimi, 2014). 
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The disadvantage of this issue is that Howarth, Santoro and Ingraffea (2011) suggested that 
methane leaked from wells nullifies any greenhouse gas benefits of natural gas derived from 
fracking as there are further leaks at transmission and distribution phases. The price decrease 
of natural gas only encourages more energy usage, negating any benefits. Also, “there is no 
question that the embrace of cheap natural gas will undercut incentives to invest in solar, wind, 
and other renewables” (Wihbey, 2015). Over the next few decades, humans are now placed 
with the responsibility to reduce the risk of ‘tipping points’ and catastrophic melting of the 
glaciers. “Natural gas is often seen as a ‘bridge’, but it is likely a bridge too far, beyond the point 
where scientists believe we can go in terms of greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere” 
(Wihbey, 2015). 
 
The third key issue is the threat to human health that fracking causes by contaminating drinking 
water supplies. The advantage is that because drinking water and the deposits of oil and gas are 
at two different levels in the ground, it is highly unlikely that well-run drilling operations, are 
creating cracks that allow chemicals to reach relatively shallow aquifers and surface water 
supplies. The responsibility lies with the government to ensure that fracking companies pay 
equal to more attention to the surface (including 500 to 1 000 feet of piping) operations in 
order to contain problems contaminating drinkable water. However, this precaution is only a 
matter of making sure that the casing is not leaking and that the cement around it does not 
have cracks. As for the flammable water, it is highly flammable in some areas and severe in a 
minority of cases, “but it is unlikely and it is often the result of leaks from activities other than 
fracking. In terms of disclosure, many of the chemicals are listed on data sheets available to 
first-responders: ‘The information is disclosed to relevant authorities’” (Wihbey, 2015). 
 
The disadvantage of this issue is that a major study (Considine, Watson, Considine, & Martin, 
2013) confirmed that fracking conducted at high volumes can contaminate drinking water. 
Numerous citizens in the USA have filed reports regarding fouled tap water; it is a fact that 
some of the tap water has even turned bubbly and flammable, as a result of increased 
methane. The companies involved cannot be trusted regarding disclosure of their chemicals, as 
roughly one in five chemicals involved in the fracking process are still classified as trade secrets 
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(Jackson, Vengosh, Carey, Davies, Darrah, O’Sullivan & Pétron, 2014). Even well-meaning 
disclosure efforts by environmental organisations are not able to provide sufficient information. 
And additionally, it is known that there are many who try taking a short cut in the field, 
regardless of the federal or state regulations that are attempted at imposing. They already 
receive dozens of violation notices at sites, with little effect. 
 
Fourthly, at times, fracking operations take place near and around populated areas, which 
affects the locally built and natural environments. The advantage is that the water intensity is 
lower for fracking than other fossil fuels and nuclear, in the sense that coal, nuclear and oil 
extraction respectively use approximately two, three, and ten times water compared to 
fracking per energy unit, and corn ethanol may use a thousand times more if the plants are 
irrigated. The operations are targeted and have a definite time limit, together with the 
productivity of the wells, there is a steady increase of more valuable output (U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, 2014).  
 
The disadvantage is that many civilians have experienced fracking operations being conducted 
within a mile radius of their homes. Yet it means that a small proportion of people shoulder the 
burden and downsides, with no real compensation for this intrusive new industrial presence 
(Kille, 2014). As it is mentioned above, fracking requires large amounts of water, making it a 
water-intensive task. A fracking well is able to use up to 20 million gallons of water per fracking, 
thereby impacting local water sources (Wihbey, 2015). In addition, due to the constant trips to 
and from the fracking sites, the water-bearing trucks deteriorate roads quicker (Kille, 2014). 
This in turn means that local budgets need to be revised and allocated to road infrastructure, 
rather than on other infrastructure development projects that may be more pressing. “Finally, 
it is also the case that relatively low impact fees are being charged and relatively little funding is 
being set aside to mitigate future problems as wells age and further clean-up is necessary. It is 
the opposite of a sustainable solution, as well production tends to drop sharply after initial 
fracking” (Wihbey, 2015).  
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Lastly, fracking wells require drilling to happen thousands of feet below the earth’s surface, 
which negatively changes the geology of the planet, leading to earthquakes.  The advantage to 
this is that earthquakes are a naturally occurring phenomenon. There have been many wells 
that have been drilled numerous times over the years, yet there are none operations-induced 
seismic effects which has impacted citizens. There is research available to suggest that the 
potential for earthquakes can be mitigated through safeguards (Zoback, 2012). 
 
The disadvantage to this that groups and individuals are only just beginning to understand what 
the impact of fracking on the local geologies is. According to the 2014 Annual Reviews of 
Environment and Resources, “between 1967 and 2000, geologists observed a steady 
background rate of 21 earthquakes of 3.0 Mw or greater in the central United States per year. 
Starting in 2001, when shale gas and other unconventional energy sources began to grow, the 
rate rose steadily to [approximately] 100 such earthquakes annually, with 188 in 2011 alone” 
(Jackson, Vengosh, Carey, Davies, Darrah, O’Sullivan & Pétron, 2014). New research on 
seismology suggests risky and unknown changes. It is not strategically advised to go headlong 
first – at massive scale – and only later discover the consequences (Wihbey, 2015). 
 
According to a new study by the University of Texas (UT), the USA government’s estimates of 
the amount of natural gas that can be extracted by fracking may be far too optimistic. In 2013, 
the US Energy Information Administration issued a report saying that, according to its analysis, 
shale wells, which require fracking to release their gas, would be productive at current levels till 
at least until 2040. However, researchers from UT’s Department of Petroleum and Geosystems 
Engineering say shale gas production may peak 20 years earlier, followed by a rapid decline in 
output. (Tully, 2014). 
 
The problem, according to the UT researchers, goes far beyond merely running out of natural 
gas. The researchers warn that the USA and many other countries, relying on a long-term 
availability of inexpensive gas, are investing billions of dollars in vehicles, factories and power 
plants that depend on gas. Major proponents of fracking are President Obama in the USA and 
Prime Minister David Cameron in Britain. Obama had boasted that their supply of natural gas 
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would be available for one hundred years and was a big factor in drawing jobs back into the 
country. Whereas Cameron has dismissed fracking opponents as being rather irrational. (Tully, 
2014). Following Trump’s inauguration as the president of USA, his administration confirmed its 
intentions to reverse Barack Obama’s climate change policies, boost fracking for oil and gas, 
and lift current restrictions affecting the coal mining sector (Jamasmie, 2017).  
 
But, should the UT scientists be right and gas production begins to fall off around 2020, all 
those billions of dollars invested into gas-based vehicles and infrastructure will have been 
wasted. The researchers conducted their own analyses of natural gas production at the four 
leading US shale gas formations: The Barnett in Texas; the Fayetteville in Arkansas, the 
Haynesville in Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas; and the Marcellus in and around the Appalachian 
Basin. These four formations provide two-thirds of US gas production. Their conclusion based 
on their findings was that not only will gas production peak in 2020, output will be halved by 
2030. (Tully, 2014). 
 
4.2.4) Why is it controversial? 
 
Shale gas production is highly controversial, in part because of environmental concerns. During 
the Bush Administration, Vice President, Dick Cheney proposed an Energy Task Force that 
recommended energy policy goals that were designed to help the private sector, and also – as 
necessary and appropriate – state and local governments to promote dependable, affordable, 
and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future (National 
Energy Policy Development Group, 2001). A recommendation of the Energy Task Force was that 
the Congress should exempt fracking from the regulations of the Safe Drinking Water Act. This 
was followed by the implementation of the National Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
 
By 2009, an introduction of a proposed legislation (two identical bills were introduced) was 
seen as there were many concerns from many quarters in both, the House and Senate. The 
Fractured Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act required the amendment of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act thereby allowing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the 
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authority to regulate fracking and to require disclosure of fracking chemicals (Congress.gov, 
2016). Opponents argued that enough detail of chemicals was already disclosed in the Material 
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). When the congressional session was concluded without any actions on the bills, the 
matter was silenced. 
 
The controversy behind fracking did not end with the close of the 111th Congress. “The Fiscal 
Year 2010 Budget Report of the House Appropriation Conference Committee called upon the 
EPA to study the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water contamination” 
(Rahm, 2011: 2977). The EPA during the Obama Administration reversed the stand taken by it 
during the Bush Administration and agreed to undertake the study. While the EPA actively 
investigates fracking and its impacts on drinking water resources, there is currently little federal 
regulatory understanding of the drilling practices. The regulations that do exist, rest primarily 
with the states, but due to the many concerns associated with the practice, the EPA indicated 
that as part of its National Enforcement Initiatives, it will make sure that the energy extraction 
sector is in compliance with the nation’s environmental laws (Rahm, 2011: 2977). 
 
However, some alternative signals are coming for the federal government. In 2010, the 
Department of Interior held a forum in November on the use of hydraulic fracturing on federal 
lands. The stated position of Interior is that they encourage the safe and environmentally 
sustainable extraction of natural gas on federal lands (Rahm, 2011: 2977). In addition, the 
Obama Administration entered into partnerships, one with China and another with Poland, to 
encourage those nations to develop their shale gas reserves. 
 
4.2.5) Water storage 
 
Most of the water that is used in the fracking process comes from surface water sources, such 
as lakes, rivers and municipal supplies. However, groundwater – where it is available in 
sufficient quantities – can also be used to enhance surface water supplies. In some states, the 
water used for fracturing is controlled by a river basin commission or water resources board, 
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such as the Susquahana River Basin Commission (SRBC) in Pennsylvania or the Delaware River 
Basin Commission (DRBC) in New York. Whereas in other places, water is owned by private 
individuals who can allocate it at their discretion. (FracFocus, 2016).  
 
Water and sand make up more than 99.5% of the fracking fluid used to hydraulically fracture a 
well. Water acts as the primary carrier fluid in the fracking process. Because of the multi-stage 
fracturing of a single horizontal shale gas well can use several million gallons of water, it is 
critical that large quantities of relatively fresh water be reasonably, and perhaps be 
continuously available.  The quality of the water is also very important because impurities can 
reduce the efficiency of the additives used in the process. (FracFocus, 2016). 
 
The amount of water used in fracking, particularly for the natural gas trapped in shale gas 
formations, may appear substantial, but it is small when compared to other water uses such as 
agriculture, manufacturing and municipal water supply. For example, electric generation uses 
nearly 150 million gallons a day in the Susquehanna River Basin, while the projected total 
demand for peak Marcellus Shale activity in the same area is 8.4 million gallons per day 
(FracFocus, 2016).  
 
A solution that promises a truly comprehensive approach to integrating all aspects of fresh 
water and wastewater management in shale oil and gas production, while optimising the 
utilisation of water resources throughout the entire lifecycle of well production, is a centralised 
approach to the treatment and reuse of wastewater. (Easton, 2016) 
 
Centralisation not only provides treatment and reuse of flow back wastewater from a large 
number of wellheads when the wells are fracked, but also provides treatment and reuse of the 
produced wastewaters for the long-term, full lifecycle of the wells – which represent the vast 
majority of wastewater flowing from wellheads. Furthermore, a centralised system can be more 
easily accessed and use alternative water sources, such as from municipal wastewater facilities, 
which otherwise would be highly unlikely to be accessed. (Easton, 2016) 
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Inherently, wellheads providing shale oil and gas production are long-term processes, typically 
exceeding 20 year terms, but conventional solutions in play for handling fresh water resources 
and wastewater are geared towards the short-term. Impounding wastewater for evaporation in 
surface ponds, trucking water over long distances to deep-well injection sites, and treating flow 
back wastewater for reuse at the wellhead are all short-term options which do not address 
critical long-term issues impacting of the industry – such as diminished water sources, 
increasing regulations limiting wastewater disposal, and growing safety and environmental 
concerns from government and the public. (Easton, 2016) 
 
The centralised wastewater management concept is gaining momentum. In North America, 
more than a dozen centralised wastewater treatment facilities servicing shale oil and gas 
drilling are now either up and producing, or in development. (Easton, 2016)  
 
In conclusion, as the purpose of the chapter was to provide a brief historical background to the 
USA’s fossil fuel industry and how the fracking process (and industry) continued to increasingly 
dominate USA’s fossil fuel industry, it can be seen that in relation to Green IPE, the controversy 
of fracking. As US Vice President Dick Cheney had proposed an Energy Task Force to 
recommend energy policies, which in turn, recommended the Congress to exempt fracking 
from the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations. Therefore, in relation to the theory, US fracking 
policies disregard the conservation of the environment. However, there can be seen in the shift 
in environmental conservation policies during the Obama Administration which will be 
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Chapter 5: USA’s Domestic Fossil Fuel Industry and International Climate Policy 
 
The chapter will explain and discuss USA’s domestic fossil fuel industry and the international 
climate policy. This will be done by locating the power of the domestic fossil industry, in the 
sense who owns, controls and drives it, as well as how powerful the federal government is, and 
what is the link to the fossil fuel industry. Followed by explaining the Kyoto Protocol, its 
limitations and Pledge and Review (that is, what are they, what role did the US play, and how 
the domestic forces share the US’s approach to this) has traced these. In addition, an 
explanation as to what the impact of these domestic forces had on parties, public discourse, 
and how did the ruling elites respond to these pressures (if any). That is how Clinton, Bush 
Junior and Obama reacted to the domestic pressures and international policy engagements. In 
relation to the theoretical perspective of the paper, the chapter relates to Neo-Gramscian 
theory and Green IPE. 
 
5.1) The Energy Sector within the USA 
 
The US energy sector and its policies is determined by federal, state, and local entities, which 
address issues of energy production, distribution, and consumption, such as building codes and 
gas mileage standards. Legislation, international treaties, subsidies and incentives to 
investment, guidelines for energy conservation, taxation and other public policy techniques are 
all examples of energy policies. (Kirkici & Bernstein, 2010). Obama’s Administration had long 
considered climate change a national security threat. According to the White House, Obama 
had signed a directive instructing the offices to develop a “centralised climate and national 
security working group” that was aimed at “identifying the U.S. national security priorities 
related to climate change and national security, and develop methods to share climate science 
and intelligence information to inform national security policies and plans,” according to the 
White House (Henry, 2016).  
 
Over the years, numerous mandates have been proposed, but no wide-ranging long-term 
energy policy has been proposed to date (Walker & Swift, 2015). This fact has been criticized 
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and concern is discernable regarding this obvious failure. Three Energy Policy Acts have been 
passed in the years 1992, 2005, and 2007 (Walker & Swift, 2015). These include many provisions 
dealing with the matter of conservation, such as the Energy Star program, and energy 
development, with grants and tax incentives for both renewable energy and non-renewable 
energy (Walker & Swift, 2015).  
 
Many people believe that due to the first oil shock in 1973, federal energy policies have been 
influenced by crisis-mentality thinking or in other words, policies have been reactive to the 
crises (Davis & Turpin, 2015). There is a promotion of expensive quick fixes and single-shot 
solutions that ignore the truths of the market and technology. Instead of providing stable rules 
that support basic research while leaving plenty of scope for American entrepreneurship and 
innovation, congresses and presidents have repeatedly supported policies which promise 
solutions that are politically self-serving, but whose prospects are doubtful, without adequate 
consideration of the financial costs, environmental costs, or national security costs of their 
actions (Davis & Turpin, 2015). There seems to be more importance given to short term 
solutions than long term ones. State-specific energy-efficiency incentive programs also play a 
substantial role in the overall energy policy of the United States, such as fracking (Davis & 
Turpin, 2015).  
 
As of July 2014, Oil Change International estimates United States’ fossil fuel subsidies at 
US$37.5 billion annually, including US$21 billion in production and exploration subsidies (Oil 
Change International, 2017). Other credible estimates of annual United States fossil fuel 
subsidies range from US$10 billion to US$52 billion annually, however it does not include the 
costs incurred by taxpayers related to the climate, local environmental, and health impacts of 
the fossil fuel industry (Oil Change International, 2017).  
 
Fossil fuel subsidies in the United States include massive military expenditures to gain and 
defend fossil fuel interests around the world, and infrastructure spending. There is related 
maintenance which is needed as well and it is based on an antiquated energy system built on 
large, remote power plants and cheap electricity (Oil Change International, 2017). Through 
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2013, fossil fuel subsidies linked to production actually increased under President Barack 
Obama’s Administration, largely as a result of an “All of the Above” energy strategy promoting 
oil and gas industry expansion. At a federal level, production and exploration subsidies – some 
of the most inefficient and least defensible subsidies – rose from US$12.5 billion in 2009 to 
US$18.5 billion in 2013 (Lin, 2014). 
 
The US oil and gas industry is one of the most influential industries on Capitol Hill.  But 
quantifying that influence is not always direct. Oil Change International, strongly believes that 
the influence of the fossil fuel industry is the major challenge to a clean energy transition.  In 
order to quantify the influence, two major measures should be traced. Firstly, the campaign 
contributions that the industry makes to elect the relative representatives, and secondly, look at 
the amount the industry spends on lobbying. (Oil Change International, 2017). 
 
These measures leave out at least two major ways that the industry wields its influence; which 
are advertising and unregulated spending. Due to there being limited transparency on these 
measures, they are not regularly traced either or monitored. Nonetheless, tracing the campaign 
contributions is a reliable indicator of whether or not a particular representative will vote to 
support the fossil fuel industry or a clean energy future. It is important to be noted that 
influence can often be much subtler and less easily quantified.  The well-known and 
documented ‘revolving door’ between the industry and government regulatory agencies is a 
very significant factor in setting policies that affect the industry. (Oil Change International, 
2017). 
 
Even though the Bush Administration had rejected the Kyoto protocol, the Obama 
Administration had attempted to adopt some Kyoto Protocol goals on a local basis. In 2015, 
carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions measured 1 925 million metric tons, or about 37% of the total 
U.S. energy-related CO₂ emissions of 5 271 million metric tons (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2016). 
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Since the early 2000s, shale gas has had a significant impact on the global energy market, 
especially its contribution on the USA’s energy production. “As of April 2013, US crude 
production was at a more than twenty-year high, at nearly 7.2 million barrels per day, with 
shale oil from the seven most productive shale-producing regions of the country accounting for 
95 percent of oil production growth from 2011 to 2013” (Shrivastava & Stefanick, 2015). It is 
often debated that regulatory requirements were compromised to allow the rapid growth of 
the fracking industry in the US, with the global temperature passing 1 degree compared to pre-
industrial levels due to greenhouse emissions, in particular due to carbon emissions of fossil 
fuels. It is estimated in the USA, that in the next 20 years’ methane will make up 44% of its 
greenhouse gas emissions. (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2016) 
 
Along with contributing to global warming pollution, methane leaks kill plants and trees, 
contribute to ozone formation, and cause natural disasters, especially earthquakes (Fischetti, 
2015). Shale gas also contains ethane. Looking at ethane and methane together, shale gas and 
oil extraction were found to be easily the dominant source giving leak rates of 0.18%-2.8% even 
before the gas was distributed to users. Some active drilling areas were notable super-emitters. 
Ethane from shale gas and oil extraction is bringing its own problems. Ethane can remain in the 
air for around two months, making it a global pollutant. Ethane measured from the top of the 
Swiss Alps has been rising since the start of large scale US shale gas extraction in 2009, 
indicating an increase in the global methane leakage from natural gas (Fuller, 2016). As one of 
the world’s biggest economies, the USA has harmed and continues to harm the environment 
more than smaller developing countries, and in doing so, its ratification of a legally binding 
emissions reduction accord is essential (Hiatt, 2015).  
 
5.2) Climate Change 
 
“In a nutshell, climate change occurs when long-term weather patterns are altered — for 
example, through human activity. Global warming is one measure of climate change, and is a 
rise in the average global temperature” (David Suzuki Foundation, 2016). The reason that 
climate change matters is because the greenhouse gases trap heat within the atmosphere, 
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which can have a range of effects on ecosystems such as rising sea levels (due to the melting of 
the polar ice caps and contributing to greater storm damage); severe weather events 
(associated with warming ocean temperatures, which leads to additional rainfall and flooding, 
and also droughts that render landscapes more susceptible to wildfires, which in turn, 
threatens habitats, homes, and lives); and heat waves (which contribute to human and animal 
deaths, wild fires, and disruption of agricultural cycles, among other things) (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).  
 
Climate change relates to green international political economy. By the cross-sectoral nature of 
the topic, climate change usually fits into various sectors, which means that the integration of 
climate change policies into other policy areas is frequently called for (OECD, 
2009). Consequently, this has resulted in the high complexity of the issue, as the problem needs 
to be addressed from multiple scales with diverse actors involved in the complex governance 
process (Rabe, 2007). The interaction of these facets leads to the political processes with 
multiple and overlapping conceptualisation, negotiation and governance issues, which requires 
the understanding of political economy processes (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). The 
understanding of the political economy of climate change could explain the formulation and 
translation of international initiatives to specific national and sub-national policy context, which 
provides an important perspective to tackle climate change and achieve environmental justice 
(Tanner & Allouche, 2011).  
 
According to Joshua Goldstein, climate change is the most important issue in International 
Relations (IR) yet it receives minimal scholarly attention (Goldstein, 2015). Climate matters 
should be discussed not only for practical reasons, but also as the core of what IR is, which is 
power residing primarily in sovereign states whose individual rational decisions often lead to 
negative outcomes. In the context of the shale oil energy policy, each IR actor’s economy 
benefits from burning fossil fuels, with potential consequences, yet no single actor can affect 
the overall outcome alone (Goldstein, 2015). 
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As Mizan Khan (2016) points out that “climate change is the poster child of global diplomacy 
today”; it is to be further noted that global diplomacy often ignores the intrinsic complexity of 
this phenomenon as a policy problem. Furthermore, Simon Dalby (2016) explains that the term 
‘environment’ has different understandings to actors in both the Global North and the South. 
The role of science in major international events during and after the Cold War demonstrates 
the important role that the environment has when prompting international action of any kind.  
 
There are a number of national and international policies for the mitigation and the prevention 
of the devastating impact of global climate change. Under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 to legally bind 
developed country parties to CO₂ emission reduction targets. Despite 192 countries signing the 
Kyoto Protocol, the two largest greenhouse gas emitters – USA and China – did not ratify the 
treaty. Consequently, the impact of the Protocol has been a mixed bag of some successes in the 
reduction of energy consumption in the developed world, but large failures to address the 
global escalation of CO₂ emissions, which have risen by 51% since 1990, 41% of which is 
contributed by China and the US (Jones, 2015).  
 
According to Vishwas Satgar (2016), the current COP 21 negotiations could be seen as leading 
to an increase of 3-4 degrees in the global temperature. The ratchet up mechanism in the COP 
21 agreement is filled with uncertainties as there are very little changes made to the conditions 
of the domestic political economy countries, geopolitical calculations of fossil fuel producers 
and the lack of resourcing to address climate debt by rich countries. As the 2015 COP 21 
summit was unable to challenge the extraction methods of fossil fuels, it could be said that the 
summit is not about systemic change; and that the discourse of the COP 21 negotiations is 
unable to address the unequal divide of responsibilities and impacts of climate change within 
the idea of the Anthropocene. It fails to appreciate that rich countries, powerful corporations 
and ruling classes are the problem but yet poor countries, the hungry, and landless and working 
class will suffer the most. COP 21 reproduces a power framework that is the problem and it fails 
to address corporate and ultimately capitalist-induced climate change (Satgar, 2016). 
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5.3) The Kyoto Protocol 
 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty that was negotiated in December 1997 at the city 
of Kyoto, Japan. It came into force on 16 February, 2005; and is regarded as the first legally 
binding agreement between nations to mandate country-by-country reductions in greenhouse-
gas emissions (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009). The protocol is the 
result of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed in 
1992. Briefly, the Convention was aimed at stabilising greenhouse-gas concentrations at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009).  
 
Under the Protocol, 37 countries have committed themselves to a reduction of four greenhouse 
gases (GHG) (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride) and two groups of 
gases (hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons) produced by them, and all member countries 
give general commitments. Annex I countries agreed to reduce their collective greenhouse gas 
emissions by 5.2% from the 1990 level. Emission limits do not include emissions by 
international aviation and shipping, but are in addition to the industrial gases, 
chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, which are dealt with under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2016). 
 
The benchmark 1990 emission levels accepted by the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC 
(decision based on two-thirds of the Conference of the Parties votes) were the values of "global 
warming potential" calculated for the IPCC Second Assessment Report. These figures are used 
for converting the various greenhouse gas emissions into comparable CO₂ equivalents (CO₂-eq) 
when computing overall sources and sinks (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2016). 
 
The Protocol allows for several ‘flexible mechanisms’, such as emissions trading, the clean 
development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation to allow Annex I countries to meet 
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their GHG emission limitations by purchasing GHG emission reductions credits from elsewhere, 
through financial exchanges, projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries, from 
other Annex I countries, or from Annex I countries with excess allowances (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). 
 
Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, each Annex I country is required to submit an 
annual report of inventories of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from sources and 
removals from sinks (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). These 
countries nominate a person, known as the designated national authority to create and manage 
its greenhouse gas inventory. Virtually all of the non-Annex I countries have also established a 
designated national authority to manage its Kyoto obligations, more specifically, the CDM 
process that determines which GHG projects they wish to propose for accreditation by the CDM 
Executive Board (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). Even if 
Annex I Parties succeed in meeting their first-round commitments, much greater emission 
reductions will be required in future to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016).  
 
In 2001, the detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at the COP 7, 
which was held in Marrakesh, and are thus referred to as the Marrakesh Accords (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). Its first commitment period started 
in 2008 and ended in 2012. The Doha Round in 2012 was known as the Doha Amendment of 
the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). The 
Protocol established a structure of rolling emission reduction commitment periods, with 
negotiations on second period commitments that were scheduled to start in 2005 (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016).  
 
An important aspect of the protocol is that the causes of the global warming are hard to fight – 
including the disposal of industrial waste – throughout the world, and in turn requires a budget 
of millions of dollars. It is for this purpose that the developed world is contributing millions of 
dollars to provide machinery to its members to control carbon emissions. The cap and trade 
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system contained in Kyoto imposes caps on the Annex I countries to stop global warming by 
cutting down carbon discharge in the air (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2016). These caps are regarded as commitments at the national level in order to stop 
greenhouse emission up to 5.2% in the coming years. If the enforcement compliance 
committee feels that the member countries are not conforming to emission limitation, then 
that member country has to make up for 30% extra along with regular limitation (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). The position of member countries 
who are working well with this protocol are Australia ranking at top position followed by 
Canada, China, the European Union, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Norway, India, Pakistan 
and Russia. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). 
 
5.3.1) Accomplishments and Failures 
 
The major accomplishment of the Kyoto Protocol is bringing awareness to the fact that 
greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced in order to protect the environment. The 
Protocol is integrating the world to work together to protect the planet, much like the world 
banded together to remedy the Ozone Hole calamity. It showed that many countries are 
serious about environmental protection and focus on what is really important: the protection of 
Earth. (Diniz, 2007)  
 
Some of the reasons why the Kyoto Protocol was a failure were because it was finalised halfway 
through its 10-year life; the United States till date refuse to ratify it; and there is an absence of 
binding targets for developing nations. (Diniz, 2007) 
 
The United States are the largest total emitter and largest emitter per capita in the world and 
unfortunately without the United States, the treaty is not as successful. The reason the United 
States would not ratify it, was due to the absence of binding targets for developing nations 
(Diniz, 2007). Both India and China’s emissions have increased dramatically; 103% and 150% 
respectively. Without binding targets for developing nations, they will only increase their 
emissions and it will be harder to reduce them in the future. Furthermore, When Al Gore and 
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Bill Clinton came to Kyoto to take part in the negotiations, they had already given up hope of 
achieving an agreement that would be acceptable to the Senate. Gore, who led the 
negotiations for the Americans, knew that he would not be able to get the minimum 67 of the 
100 senators needed to support ratification. (Diniz, 2007). 
 
According to some US delegates to Kyoto, the US negotiators believed it was possible to get the 
Senate’s support for an agreement that committed the US to a zero percent increase in 
emissions from 1990 to 2012. But when Al Gore arrived at the table, he said the USA had to 
give more, and consequently the delegation ended up committing the Americans to a seven 
percent reduction in emissions. Gore knew that US legislators would not accept this since the 
Senate had just unanimously approved a resolution that was contradictory to it. (Diniz, 2007). 
 
5.3.2) Lessons Learnt 
 
As mentioned above, the protocol consists of a set of explicit reduction commitments by 
developed countries, including programmes related to incentivise the increase of removals by 
sinks and the transfer of cleaner technologies from developed-to-developed countries (Joint 
Implementation – JI) and developed-to-developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism – 
CDM) (Diniz, 2007). An investment that produces properly certified emission reductions in 
developed or developing countries implies that the investor has reduced the emissions of his 
own country. The same elements of the Convention and the bulk of the Brazilian proposal on 
the CDF are included in the Kyoto Protocol (Diniz, 2007).  
 
More attention is given to the role of private investment in the transfer of technology. In the 
case of environmental problems, data cited in for the period 1990-1997 showed the growing 
importance of private-sector transfers from foreign direct investment: nearly US$ 250 billion 
against US$ 5.25 billion from Global Environment Facility (Forsyth, 1999). The CDM was inspired 
by the Brazilian proposal of a CDF (whose nature changed). The CDF was conceived as a non-
compliance mechanism that imposed a penalty on developed countries that failed to perform 
at least as well as the proposed commitments. Whereas, the CDM has a function to help 
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developed countries to achieve their commitments, and the CDF was a punitive device, and the 
CDM an additional instrument. (Diniz, 2007). 
 
The key lessons from the CDM include: (1) the cost-effectiveness and quality of the projects 
may be reduced due to the necessary resources to obtain project approval; (2) the need to 
ensure the credibility of emission reductions presents a significant regulatory challenge; and (3) 
due to the trade-offs with offsets, the use of such programs may be, at best, a temporary 
solution. (Diniz, 2007). 
 
Some problems of the Kyoto Protocol must be discussed (Diniz, 2007): 
a) The use of removals by sinks as a form to mitigate climate change is controversial. Some 
argue that reforestation projects do not address the main causes of greenhouse gas 
emissions (industrialisation and energy use). Another argument against this is that 
projects have primarily focused on sinks rather than on the transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies because the former are cheaper. The cherrypicking problem arises 
when investors from developed countries tend to invest in the cheaper projects, leaving 
the more expensive ones to governments or international agencies. On the other hand, 
the impact of each measure is differentiated and the implicit trade-off can be useful for 
policy purposes. 
b) There are no side payments as an incentive for developing countries to assume 
commitments, as these commitments are only set for developed countries. This problem 
contributes to a smaller fall of emissions at a higher cost. 
c) Due to the leakages from developed countries, developing countries may additionally 
increase their emissions. This in turn means that investors may favour developing 
countries because of a less stringent environmental law and absence of environmental 
commitments. Absence of a leakage prevention mechanism in the form of sanctions and 
trade restrictions between countries is a potential problem in a protocol if there is not an 
almost total adhesion. 
d) The so-called ‘baseline problem’ is that emission reductions cannot be precisely 
measured, which then makes it relevant to question the effectiveness of the 
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environmental investments for climate change mitigation. Therefore, it is suggested to 
establish a methodology to measure liquid gains in GHGs emissions that has a consensus 
between researchers in the field. The task of establishing baselines in order to measure 
the liquid gains should be given to an independent body like the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). As of recent times, methodologies submitted to 
the Executive Board of the CDM are referred by independent researchers and may be 
approved or not. 
e) Emission commitments are temporary (2008-2012), fixed at 5% below the 1990 levels, 
and amendments are possible. This factor may undermine the long run results of the 
protocol if there is no voluntary adhesion to the cleaner standard after this period. Post-
Kyoto period (after 2012) discussions have revealed another problem: the lack of a 
mechanism to extend the compromise to other periods. This would lower the cost of 
implementation of measures to curb emissions and could produce long run results. 
f) The minimum participation clause, which is that 55 developed countries responsible for 
55% of carbon dioxide emissions, acts to deter free-riding until this limit is reached. From 
this point on there is no incentive to adhesion and the countries shall have the benefits 
without cost.  
g) There is no mechanism to enforce compliance of the commitments. The initial Brazilian 
proposal of CDF would work to enforce compliance, with incentives in the form of 
emissions trading and punishment in the form of a monetary contribution to a fund 
proportional to the difference between actual data and commitments. In the CDM 
system, there are stimuli but no sanctions. 
 
5.4) The IPCC 
 
Briefly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the international body for 
assessing the science related to climate change. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its 
impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation (IPCC, 2016).  
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The IPCC works by assessing published literature. It does not conduct its own scientific 
research. For all findings, author teams use defined language to characterize their degree of 
certainty in assessment conclusions (IPCC, 2016). IPCC assessments point to areas of well-
established knowledge and of evolving understanding, as well as where multiple perspectives 
exist in the literature (IPCC, 2016). 
 
IPCC assessments provide a scientific basis for governments at all levels to develop climate-
related policies, and they underlie negotiations at the UN Climate Conference – the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (IPCC, 2016). The assessments are 
policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive, that is, they may present projections of future 
climate change based on different scenarios and the risks that climate change poses and discuss 
the implications of response options, but they do not tell policymakers what actions to take 
(IPCC, 2016).  
 
It embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced scientific information to 
decision-makers because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature. Participation in the 
IPCC is open to all member countries of the WMO and United Nations (IPCC, 2016). It currently 
has 195 members. The Panel, made up of representatives of the member states, meets in 
plenary sessions to take major decisions (IPCC, 2016). The IPCC Bureau, elected by member 
governments, provides guidance to the Panel on the scientific and technical aspects of the 
Panel’s work and advises the Panel on related management and strategic issues (IPCC, 2016). 
 
5.5) Kyoto protocol implementation: Bush Jnr. Administration  
 
The USA has now made a pact with many Asian countries called the Asian Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate. Participants want to implement an alternative strategy to 
tackle climate change (Lenntech, 2016). This is a technological operation to make fossil fuels 
cleaner by introducing clean coal and nuclear power. It also promotes the application and 
introduction of carbon sinks to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Lenntech, 2016). Unlike Kyoto, 
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it does not focus on emission reduction in a certain target year. The alternative to Kyoto now 
involves the USA, Australia, China, Japan, India and South-Korea (Lenntech, 2016).  
 
This new USA strategy is in line with its earlier comments on the Kyoto Protocol, namely that 
battling global warming should be achieved by voluntary effort rather than by mandatory 
emission reductions (Lenntech, 2016). The USA mentions that this new agreement does not 
challenge the Kyoto Protocol and that the participating countries have either signed Kyoto or 
were not even involved in Kyoto in the first place (Lenntech, 2016). The USA government notes 
that investing in cleaner technologies not only meets national emissions reductions. It also 
reduces poverty and promotes economic development (Lenntech, 2016). This new alternative 
to Kyoto is widely debated because many countries still feel American president George W. 
Bush should have ratified the Kyoto Protocol because according to some, nothing can be 
achieved where climate change is concerned, without actual greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets (Lenntech, 2016).  
 
The enormity of the Koch fortune is no mystery. Brothers Charles and David are each worth 
more than US$40 billion; and their hunger for growth is insatiable. The Kochs are the US’s 
homegrown oligarchs; have managed to corner the market on Republican politics and are 
attempting to buy Congress and the White House. Since 1960, the value of the Koch Industries 
has grown by 4 200-fold, outpacing the Standard & Poor's index by nearly 30 times. On average, 
Koch projects double the company’s revenue every six years (Dickinson, 2014). The company is 
now a key player in the fracking boom that's allowing the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia 
as the world's top oil producer, even if it means to endanger America's groundwater (Dickinson, 
2014). “In 2012, a subsidiary of the company opened a pipeline capable of carrying 250,000 
barrels a day of fracked crude from South Texas to Corpus Christi, where the company owns a 
refinery complex, and it has announced plans to further expand its Texas pipeline operations. In 
a recent acquisition, Koch bought Frac-Chem, a top provider of hydraulic fracturing chemicals to 
drillers. Thanks to the Bush Administration's anti-regulatory agenda – which the Koch Industries 
helped craft – Frac-Chem's chemical cocktails, injected deep under the nation's aquifers, are 
almost entirely exempt from the Safe Drinking Water Act” (Dickinson, 2014). The Koch brothers 
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get richer at the costs of the US citizens’ ill health, foul water and a global climate crisis that 
threatens life (Dickinson, 2014).  
 
The continuous debates and efforts around combatting global warming has been existent in the 
United States for almost two decades. It is very often described as an attempt by the 
companies of the fossil fuel industry to hinder government regulations on their activities. 
“While emphasizing this dimension of the US climate denial movement, two additional factors 
which have been instrumental in blocking strong climate action. First, climate denial stems from 
the strong ideological commitment of small-government conservatives and libertarians 
to laisser-faire and their strong opposition to regulation. Second, in order to disarm their 
opponents, US climate deniers often rest their case on the defense of the way of life, defined by 
high consumption and ever-expanding material prosperity. Therefore, US climate denial 
movement is best understood as a combination of these two trends”. (Collomb, 2014:1).  
 
“Climate science in the United States has been uniquely politicized, which has caused 
considerable confusion among the general public regarding the climate change issue. Right-
wing politicians and think tanks have used the legacy of climate research strategically to deny 
the current crisis by falsely depicting greenhouse science as uncertain and contradictory. The 
corporate media has largely accepted this frame of the issue. This history helps account for the 
success of the carbon interests and the politicians who work for them and the lack of political 
action against global warming in the United States” (Armitage, 2005: 417). 
 
5.6) Kyoto protocol implementation: Obama Administration 
 
There have been arguments over how to differentiate between wealthy and underprivileged 
which remain, but China’s climate pact with the USA is evidence that powerful developing 
countries realise they have to contribute (Climate Home, 2016). Speaking at the 2014 UN 
climate summit in New York, President Barack Obama picked up the baton from Bill Clinton, 
backing a new global pact, but adding it needed to have worldwide buy-in (Climate Home, 
2016).  
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Even while Barack Obama was in the White House; a president who had placed climate issues 
high on the agenda and who had a solid Democratic majority in both houses of Congress up 
until the mid-term elections in autumn 2010; the interests of the states continued to take 
precedence over party affiliation for some Democrats on the climate issue (The Research 
Council of Norway, 2016). As a result, President Obama had been unsuccessful in gaining 
approval for climate legislation that would have paved the way for the USA to sign a new 
climate agreement (The Research Council of Norway, 2016).  
 
5.7) The Paris Agreement 2015 
 
The Paris Agreement is an agreement within the UNFCCC that addresses greenhouse gases 
emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance, commencing in the year 2020. The language of 
the agreement was negotiated by representatives of 195 countries at the 21st Conference of 
the Parties of the UNFCC, held in Paris. It was adopted by consensus on 12 December 2015 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). It was opened for signature 
on 22 April 2016 – which is also known as Earth day – in a ceremony in New York City (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). As of November 2016, 193 UNFCCC 
members have signed the treaty, 110 of which have ratified it. After the European Union 
ratified the agreement in October 2016, there were enough countries that had ratified the 
agreement that produce enough of the world's greenhouse gases for the agreement to enter 
into force. The agreement went into effect on 4 November 2016 (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 2016).  
 
More recently, the 2015 Paris Agreement was adopted under the UNFCC to chart a new 
international response to climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2015). This paper will examine the main tenants of the 2015 Paris Agreement; highlight 
the similarities and differences with the Kyoto Protocol; and outline some of the lessons learnt 
from the limited success of the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2015). A secondary focus of the research will be to examine the role of the 
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United States in these international climate change treaties by analysing the domestic policies, 
politics, and greenhouse gas emission trends within the US. In this regard, special attention will 
be paid to the role of the energy sector, particularly since the US is has recently re-emerged as 
the largest producer of crude oil in the world (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2015).  
 
At the recent COP 21 held in Paris in December, governments from nearly 200 countries signed 
a universal agreement that set ambitious goals to limit temperature rises by cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions, and to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate change, and to hold 
governments to account for reaching those targets (Goldenberg, Vidal, Taylor, Vaughan & 
Harvey, 2015). Despite this, there was no outcome on the process of fracking even though 
there was a strong urge by participants to reach out to governments and the United Nations 
(Vermont Law School, 2015). Furthermore, developing countries (including oil-exporting 
countries) were unhappy and unconvinced with the major industrialists who were ruining the 
planet, and getting the development outcome. And they were suddenly being asked to cut back 
their energy usage, but were not yet ‘caught up’ (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2015).  
 
According to UNEP, the emission cut targets in November 2016 will result in temperature rise 
by 3C above pre-industrial levels, far above the 2ᵒC of the Paris climate agreement. Agreement 
came into force in November 2016 (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
2015). Al Gore stated that "no agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over 
time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon 
pollution through the framework of this agreement" (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2015). According to a study published in Nature – a British interdisciplinary 
scientific journal on June 2016, current country pledges are too low to lead to a temperature 
rise below the Paris Agreement temperature limit of "well below 2 °C" (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
Bulbul Shrivastava  433959 
USA’s Policies on Fracking  University of the Witwatersrand 
Page 59 of 126 
 
Institutional asset owners associations and think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council 
(WPC) have observed that the stated objectives of the Paris Agreement are implicitly based on 
the assumption that United Nations member states (including high polluters which generate 
more than half the world’s greenhouse gas emissions), “will somehow drive down their carbon 
pollution voluntarily and assiduously without any binding enforcement mechanism to measure 
and control CO₂ emissions at any level from factory to state, and without any specific penalty 
gradation or fiscal pressure (for example a carbon tax) to discourage bad behaviour.” This, 
according to academics is an example of circular logic, which is an agreement or argument that 
is formulated in advance as to what it wants to achieve (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
It is possible to draw four key comparisons between the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement of 2015. Firstly, the Kyoto Protocol:  
1) The GHG emission coverage of the Kyoto Protocol was insufficient to stop the growth of 
global GHG emissions. Thus, expanding the coverage is a priority. The Kyoto Protocol 
included rules tailored for specific sectors’ or countries’ contexts that helped ensure 
their participation. In that perspective, it can be strategic to implement specific rules as 
long as it does not jeopardize the global environmental integrity. (Morel & Shishlov, 
2015).  
2) The Kyoto Protocol is presented as an internationally binding agreement on GHG 
emissions. However, its binding nature is rather limited and virtual in practice. Extensive 
negotiations and resources were dedicated in demarcating the boundaries of compliance 
and dedicated tools that in some instances were not really used by countries. Dedicating 
significant negotiation resources and time, as it has been the case until now, on 
emissions reduction commitments and their legally binding nature may thus not be the 
most efficient approach. (Morel & Shishlov, 2015). 
3) Implementing Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) procedures is essential to 
build trust among countries and to recognise various domestic policies implemented. 
Therefore, it is an essential characteristic for any global agreement on climate change. 
The Kyoto Protocol initiated the development and implementation of several MRV 
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frameworks providing reliable and transparent information on GHG emissions and 
emission reductions. (Morel & Shishlov, 2015). 
4) Flexibility should be integrated both in the adoption process and the agreement itself. 
Similar to the Kyoto Protocol, a new treaty could be adopted in two steps: a framework 
agreement in Paris and eventually the detailed rules and mechanisms in the following 
years. (Morel & Shishlov, 2015). 
 
The Paris Agreement: 
1) The goal of the Paris Agreement is to limit the temperature rise to two degrees Celsius 
from pre-industrial levels. (Morel & Shishlov, 2015). 
2) Enforcement: The Paris Agreement aims to achieve collaboration and individual 
responsibility to meet the ultimate goal. (Morel & Shishlov, 2015). 
3) The focus of the Paris Agreement is primarily on switching to renewable energy. (Morel 
& Shishlov, 2015). 
4) There was not much emphasis on technology transfer and international collaboration in 
R&D in Kyoto Protocol, while the Paris Agreement clearly mentions the collaboration 
between countries to develop environment-friendly technologies. (Morel & Shishlov, 
2015). 
 
The Paris Agreement also provided some support systems to achieve effective implementation 
(Fan, 2016). The first support system is the financial mechanism, where developed countries 
are being obliged to create a Green Climate Fund of about US$ 100 billion to help developing 
countries to achieve their goals (Fan, 2016). The second is that of international collaboration. It 
also mentions of international collaboration to develop environment-friendly technologies, 
besides technology transfer to developing countries. It further mentions of undertaking joint 
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5.8) USA’s role in implementing the Paris Agreement 
 
The Paris Agreement was, in part, structured to avoid the need for Senate ratification. Instead, 
the procedurally oriented provisions within the agreement will be legally binding within the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty which the USA 
ratified in 1992 (Lewis, 2016). Under COP21, the USA will establish its own, national 
commitment to reduce emissions and to report on the country’s progress. How the USA, or 
other countries, choose to reduce emissions will be entirely determined by the participating 
nations (Lewis, 2016).  
 
Even before an agreement was reached in Paris, some members of the Congress expressed 
opposition to both the COP21, and the Obama Administration’s approach to negotiations 
(Lewis, 2016). It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the Congress would cooperate 
in enacting legislation aimed at achieving the summit’s agenda (Lewis, 2016). However, the 
Paris agreement is not a treaty; accordingly, it will not have a binding effect on all future 
presidents, and subsequent administrations may back away from the commitments made in 
Paris by the current administration (Lewis, 2016). Consequently, the long-term durability of the 
Paris agreement in the USA will largely depend on national will and international pressure 
(Lewis, 2016).  
 
In some respects, from the perspective of the USA, the Paris summit could be seen as a 
reflection of the Obama Administration’s commitment and policy agenda toward reducing 
greenhouse gases and promoting renewable energy (Lewis, 2016). This policy agenda could be 
seen early in the Obama presidency with the passage of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009 (Lewis, 2016). After being subject to the robust 
partisan debate, the ARRA provided benefits to subsidize investments in green energy, 
including projects related to wind, solar and biomass electricity generation facilities (Lewis, 
2016). One of these benefits included a cash grant in lieu of an investment tax credit for certain 
renewable projects, which assisted in replacing the use of such tax credits during the recession 
(Lewis, 2016).  
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Barack Obama’s commitment to addressing climate change had also been reflected in a number 
of rule-making decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency (Lewis, 2016). For example, 
on October 30, 2009, the EPA published a rule mandating the reporting of greenhouse gases 
from sources that emit significant amounts of carbon dioxide per year in the USA. This 
greenhouse gas reporting rule affects an estimated 8,000 facilities, including large stationary 
sources that produce roughly 85% to 90% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the country 
(Lewis, 2016). The reporting program collects data from 41 source categories, targeting the oil 
and gas industry as well as solid waste landfills. The rule was amended in January of this year to 
streamline the reporting process, but it is unclear whether this update will affect a legal 
challenge currently pending before the D.C. Circuit (Lewis, 2016).  
 
More recently, in August 2015, the Obama Administration published the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP), which established the first-ever national standards to address carbon dioxide pollution 
from existing power plants (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). The CPP 
included interim and final statewide goals for carbon dioxide emissions. Uncertainty 
surrounding the CPP does persist, however, in large part due to the USA Supreme Court’s 
decision in February to stay implementation of the program pending legal challenges (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). Nevertheless, the EPA had previously imposed 
an emissions limit on new, modified and reconstructed fossil fuel-fired power plants, and this 
rule has not been affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2016).  
 
The USA’s Department of the Interior has played a role in seeking to reduce the country’s 
carbon emissions, In addition to efforts by the EPA. In January 2016, the secretary of the 
interior declared a three-year standstill on coal leases on federal land (Jones Day, 2016). During 
this time, the agency will review the federal coal program, assessing what it charges as royalties 
as well as the program’s overall effect on climate change. This marks a significant development 
because roughly 40% of coal in the United States is mined on federal land (Jones Day, 2016).  
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Despite certain public congressional opposition to the COP21, Congress, too, has played a role 
in supporting green initiatives (Jones Day, 2016). In December 2015, Congress stretched the 
production tax credit (PTC) and the investment tax credit (ITC), thereby promoting and 
incentivising the development and production of wind and solar energy (Jones Day, 2016). One 
initial estimate by Bloomberg New Energy Finance suggested that the net result of the 
extensions could be to spur on US$ 73 billion in new investments and to provide access to 
renewable energy to more than 8 million additional households (Jones Day, 2016). 
 
Even with uncertainty in the implementation of the Paris Agreement and continued challenges 
regarding federal programs, such as those directed at the CPP, there have been significant 
indications that various states and businesses of the USA have begun to taken their own 
approach. In doing so, states and business activities have furthered many of the same goals and 
aspirations reflected by the Paris agreement (United Nations Secretary-General, 2016). States 
continue to push ahead with renewable portfolio standards to encourage the development of 
renewable energy (United Nations Secretary-General, 2016). For example, the Oregon 
Legislature passed a bill that is aimed at phasing out coal-fired power in the state by the end of 
2035 and also require that by 2040, half of the state’s electricity come from renewable sources 
(United Nations Secretary-General, 2016). In 2015, California and Hawaii passed legislation that 
continues to ratchet up their renewables mandates. Similarly, New York Governor, Andrew 
Cuomo pledged that the state would eliminate use of coal-based power completely by 2020 
(United Nations Secretary-General, 2016).  
 
Meanwhile, the business community has shown its promise to fund efforts to challenge climate 
change (Renewables Now, 2016). Green bonds, which fund projects specifically to produce 
environmental or climate-related benefits, have seen a rapid increase in use since 2013. 
According to the Climate Bond Initiative, in 2015, US$41.8 billion of green bonds were issued, 
up from the US$4 billion figure in 2010 cited in a World Bank report on green bonds. Reflecting 
a growth in demand from investors, this trend appears to be continuing, as in the first two 
months of 2016, US$11.83 billion of green bonds have already been issued (Renewables Now, 
2016). Apple issued its first-ever green bond, a US$1.5 billion offering issued in February 2016, 
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which would be used to finance renewable energy, energy storage and energy efficiency, as 
well as green buildings and resource conversation efforts (Renewables Now, 2016).  
 
Taken as a whole, there is evidence that the USA, whether via federal regulation, state action or 
industry efforts, is on a path to address many of the same issues that the Paris summit seeks to 
affect (Worland, 2016). Whether the Paris agreement has a long-term effect on the United 
States and how aggressively these green trends continue will depend largely on the political 
realities of the time. Without waiting for the political winds of change, the Obama 
Administration had already worked to implement some elements of the Paris agreement. On 
March 10 2016, Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau agreed on measures to 
curb methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, and the EPA followed suit by pledging 
regulation of such measures (Worland, 2016). It is hard to imagine, however, a long-term 
commitment to climate change without significant congressional support, even if the Paris 
Agreement did not require it (Worland, 2016). Nevertheless, businesses in the USA seem poised 
to continue to act in a new and sustainable way, in part because businesses anticipate further 
constraints on emissions and because corporate social responsibility continues to grow in 
importance to consumers, shareholders and investors (Worland, 2016).  
 
5.8.1) Obama’s ratchet up mechanism 
 
A top-down approach along the main features of the Kyoto Protocol was supported by the 
European Union (EU) in the run-up to the Copenhagen conference of 2009, but it wanted the 
Annex I/non-Annex I opposition to be overcome (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2016). However, a fully-fledged top down approach as described above 
currently does not have sufficient support among governments to be seriously considered for 
international mitigation policy. This is due to a general reluctance to accept stringent mitigation 
commitments and control of their accomplishment by an international institution. Key 
developing and industrialised countries alike are wary to take legally binding emissions 
commitments (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). 
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Given the post-2009 fatigue with top-down mitigation policies, bottom-up approaches have 
become more fashionable. They can take various forms inside and outside the UNFCCC (Climate 
Policy Info Hub, 2016). Generally, they will be based on unilateral pledges of mitigation action 
as well as introduce domestic mitigation policy instruments which can subsequently be linked 
among various jurisdictions (Climate Policy Info Hub, 2016). Such approaches could tackle a 
number of specific issues, for example the unilateral and then coordinated removal of fossil fuel 
subsidies. ‘Mitigation clubs’ could form that provide incentives for compliance with their 
declared mitigation engagement through trade-related policies, for example in the framework 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Group of 7 (G7) or 
Group of 20 (G20) (Climate Policy Info Hub, 2016). The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 is an 
example for a bottom-up approach. The pledges made in Copenhagen (and thereafter) take 
several forms, ranging from absolute targets with different base years over intensity and 
technology targets to sectoral mitigation activities (Climate Policy Info Hub, 2016).  
 
The key challenge with bottom-up approaches is how to generate a dynamic strategy that leads 
to significant mitigation compared to a business-as-usual emissions pathway. So far, there is no 
empirical evidence that bottom-up approaches achieved such mitigation (Spak, 2010). The 
pledges under the Copenhagen Accord, for example, are not consistent with a lowest global 
cost mitigation path, and would likely lead to at least a 3°C warming by the end of the century 
(Spak, 2010). The inconsistency of the pledges with an emissions path respecting the 
internationally agreed below 2°C target has also been emphasized in the annual ‘emissions gap’ 
reports by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (Spak, 2010).  
 
Experience with these types of bottom-up pledging exists in domestic policy-making, where 
voluntary agreements between governments and industries have been used to reduce 
GHG emissions from the sectors in question (Åhman, Nilsson & Johansson, 2016). According to 
studies, results have shown that a majority of such agreements do not go further than business 
as usual activities by the companies involved, unless there is a strong regulatory threat from the 
government, or a cultural element that makes companies accountable to public pressure 
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(Åhman, Nilsson & Johansson, 2016). This demonstrates the potential weakness of using a 
bottom-up approach for the international climate regime (Åhman, Nilsson & Johansson, 2016).  
 
A key feature of a hybrid approach is the combination of top-down and bottom-up elements. 
Already during the negotiations of the UNFCCC, a ‘pledge and review’ system was proposed by 
Japan and the United States but did not find agreement in the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations (Sampson & Chambers, 2008). After the Copenhagen failure, this idea was 
resuscitated and was likely to inform the design of the 2015 agreement. Key characteristics of a 
hybrid approach were seen as the competency of a multilateral institution when it came to 
reviewing the mitigation proposals that were made by various governments. If the review is just 
a ‘rubber-stamping’, then there is a fundamental bottom-up system (Sampson & Chambers, 
2008). If, however, the review leads to a public evaluation, this could have consequences, at the 
very least by providing transparency that is akin to a ‘naming and shaming’ of governments 
with a weak proposed mitigation pledge. Resulting international pressure could lead to an 
enhanced pledge (Sampson & Chambers, 2008). Combined with strong MRV and credible 
accounting procedures, such a system would be closer to a top-down approach (Sampson & 
Chambers, 2008). The only remaining difference would be that the commitments are not 
negotiated simultaneously as would be the case in a pure top down system (Sampson & 
Chambers, 2008).  
 
The United States is a crucial player in the Paris Agreement, not only because it is the world’s 
second largest emitter of GHGs but also because it has a special role to play in terms of 
triggering action from other countries. As described above, the Agreement relies inherently on 
vagueness in its specification of commitments, compliance requirements and the ratcheting-up 
mechanism (Yeo, 2016). While such vagueness was necessary diplomacy for forging the 
Agreement itself and attract broad participation, it locks success to reliance on key countries to 
go first and set the stage for a snowball effect (or race to the top). As argued by Underdal 
(1994: 179-180), “the more complex the negotiation setting (that is, the larger the number of 
actors and the number and ‘intricacy’ of issues), the more likely that some actors will emerge as 
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leaders and others as followers…, and the more critical leadership becomes as a determinant of 
success”.  
 
Arguably, the United States must play an important role in such leadership for at least two 
reasons. First, as the largest economy in the world and the second largest carbon emitter the 
United States is often pointed to as a key actor (and thus influencer) because of its major 
historical responsibilities for the climate change problem (World Resources Institute, 2016). 
What happens with U.S. climate policy has an effect for the entire world. Second, in the history 
of international climate negotiations the United States has often played the role as crucial 
laggard, blaming lack of participation by all major emitters and flawed treaty design for its own 
non-participation – for instance in the case of the Kyoto Protocol (Harvey, 2015). Experience 
thus indicates that for any comprehensive international climate agreement to work, it is 
imperative that the world’s most powerful country shows interest in participation and 
compliance with its pledges (Harvey, 2015). If a pivotal actor like the United States should fail to 
implement its commitments, it will likely adversely affect other parties’ incentives to adopt and 
implement ambitious NDCs (Harvey, 2015).  
 
The dynamic between domestic politics and international negotiation positions is important in 
order to understand the scope for acceptance of international commitments in all countries. In 
the USA’s case this is influenced by the separation of powers in the political system that gives 
the president great freedoms in international negotiations, but allows the Senate decisive 
powers in issues of treaty ratification and funding of new policy programs. Hence, the 
interaction between the executive and legislative branches of government defines the scope for 
USA’s pledge at Paris, as well as the prospects to fulfil them. It helps explain why the United 
States can come to play an important role for the success of the Paris Agreement if it engages in 
a role as first mover (in a race to the top), but can also explain why in a difficult collaboration 
problem, like climate change, the United States may have difficulties in taking on such 
leadership. (Yeo, 2016). 
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In Paris, USA’s diplomacy and personal engagement by President Barack Obama and Secretary 
of State John Kerry helped craft compromises that were necessary for the adoption of the 
Agreement. Importantly, Obama engaged with China’s President Xi Jinping through crucial 
bilateral contact in the months before the Paris meeting, paving the way for support of the 
Agreement by both countries (Goldenberg, 2014; Henderson, 2015). At the Paris meeting, 
President Obama said: “I’ve come here personally, as the leader of the world’s largest economy 
and the second-largest emitter, to say that the United States of America not only recognises our 
role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do something about it” (White 
House, 2015). The Obama Administration acknowledged that the United States can play a key 
role in inspiring and convincing other countries to address their GHG emissions, and committed 
to reducing U.S. GHG emissions 26%-28% below 2005 levels by 2025, premised on numerous 
domestic policy measures that had been or were to be implemented (Bang & Schreurs, 2016). 
Ambitious domestic investments in clean energy, energy efficiency programs, and new federal 
regulations limiting carbon emissions from power plants are among the climate policies 
initiated by the Obama Administration. (Yeo, 2016). 
 
The Obama Administration had fought hard for changes in domestic climate policy. At the 
outset of his first term, President Obama pushed for the Congress to pass climate legislation. 
Several bills were debated, and in June 2009 Congressmen Waxman and Markey’s American 
Clean Energy and Security Act narrowly passed a vote in the House yet later died in the Senate 
(Bang & Skodvin, 2014). Voting on this controversial bill largely followed party lines, reflecting 
deep and bitter polarisation between the Republicans and Democrats (Skocpol, 2013). No 
climate bill has been debated in the Congress since, and with Republican majorities in both, the 
House and the Senate after the 2012 elections, climate legislation was no longer on the 
congressional agenda. In his second term, therefore, President Obama decided to use executive 
powers to circumvent the congressional gridlock on climate policy. (Yeo, 2016). 
 
Acting on the Supreme Court’s ruling from 2009, which identified carbon emissions as a 
pollutant causing risks to the health and welfare of citizens, Obama ordered the Environmental 
Protection Agency to develop regulations under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to cut CO₂ emissions in 
Bulbul Shrivastava  433959 
USA’s Policies on Fracking  University of the Witwatersrand 
Page 69 of 126 
 
the power sector by 32% by 2030 (Bang, 2015). The EPA worked with stakeholders and state-
level regulators over two years (2013–2015) to set up regulations (i.e. the Clean Power Plan) 
that engaged states to design individual plans for cutting carbon emissions from power plants. 
States were assigned individual emissions reduction targets, and were encouraged to find policy 
solutions adapted to local circumstances to minimize negative effects on industry and 
consumers (EPA, 2015).  
 
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) was extremely controversial among policymakers at both the 
federal and the state levels. The controversy centred on whether the Clean Air Act gave the 
president and the EPA the authority to introduce wide-ranging regulations for CO₂ emissions 
without involving the Congress. Opponents at the federal and state levels had sought to put up 
barriers. Republican leaders in Congress have vowed to cancel the CPP at the first opportunity. 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (Republican from Kentucky) encouraged states not to 
start developing plans, arguing that they would be wasting resources since the CPP would likely 
be removed either through congressional action by the Republican majority or through the 
courts (Cama, 2016). Several votes in Congress in 2013–2015 tried to remove the EPA’s 
authority on the issue; however, those bills that passed were vetoed by the president.  
 
In October 2015, a coalition of 26 states – many of which depended heavily on coal for power 
generation – brought litigation against the EPA, arguing that the CPP represented a ‘power 
grab’ by the federal government over state-level electricity systems that would be excessively 
burdensome for the states’ economies (Bang & Schreurs, 2016). A significant blow to the 
Obama Administration’s climate policy came in February 2016 when a 5-4 decision in the 
Supreme Court stayed implementation of the CPP until judicial review of its legality. The Court’s 
decision illustrated the fragility of the Obama Administration’s climate policy and the significant 
role of judicial review when executive power was used to impose policy in a controversial field. 
If the Supreme Court decided to hear the case, its ruling might have influenced the future of the 
CPP as well as the USA’s ability to fulfil its commitment in the Paris Agreement.  
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Many of USA’s states had put on hold any effort to develop state implementation plans for 
adhering to the CPP, while other states were pursuing climate action regardless of the 
uncertainty surrounding the plan’s future (U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 2017). Deep 
polarisation in USA climate policy has affected its ability to live up to the promises it made in 
Paris. “Without a firm domestic policy strategy, like the CPP or some other federal climate 
policy, investors and business owners will have weak incentives to make long-term business 
decisions that include a pathway to a low carbon economy. Moreover, the U.S. NDC under the 
Paris Agreement will be less credible. U.S. political parties greatly disagree on the importance of 
climate policy action. Most Democrats accept that climate change is a serious problem that 
requires political action to reduce emissions. Most Republicans, on the other hand, are not 
committed to addressing the climate change problem, because they do not believe in the 
science or because they think it is premature to risk the potential economic hardship that 
climate action might bring” (U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 2017).  
 
These different views regarding the need for climate policy action conveyed the level of 
willingness to recognise the Paris Agreement as a priority for the United States. While President 
Obama and a clear majority in the Democratic Party were fully committed, Republican leaders 
reacted very differently to the Agreement’s adoption. The immediate reaction of leading 
Republicans after COP 21 indicated a looming fight over the commitment to the Paris 
Agreement. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “Obama is making promises he can't 
keep” and should remember that the Agreement “is subject to being shredded” after the 2016 
election. With reference to the presidential election, McConnell said the Agreement could be 
reversed if the Republicans won the White House (U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 
2017). Republicans argued that the deal is simply politically binding, not judicially binding, and 
hence barely worth any serious attention. Congressman Ed Whitfield (Republican from 
Kentucky) described the Paris Agreement as merely a ‘signal’ of the Obama Administration’s 
preferences rather than a treaty. He said: “While some may claim the resulting deal is a grand 
triumph, the bottom line is that this was a nonbinding political document that does not impose 
any new obligation on the United States”. He added that Obama “misled the international 
community in Paris” (U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 2017).  
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“The international climate change negotiations leading to and including the Copenhagen and 
Cancun Conferences of the Parties in 2009 and 2010 have shown a very different balance of 
power from those of the 1997 Kyoto round. This new world dis(order) was characterized by 
insecurity of the United States in the face of economic and political decline vis-a`-vis China; 
fragmentation of the Group of 77 developing nations negotiating bloc; and weakening of the 
European Union, which was cut out entirely from the group negotiating the Copenhagen 
Accord. In addition to old alignments of developing countries based on solidarity, negotiating 
blocs have fractured along lines of responsibility for climate change, capability to address it, and 
national vulnerability to climate risks.” The US’s recent unwillingness to discuss climate change 
is due to its insecurity about its unability to provide jobs for its workers in the future, where 
emerging economies, like China and India, are growing at an exponential rate. (Roberts, 2011: 
776). 
 
This explains the contradictory nature of Obama's foreign policy on climate and domestic policy 
on energy: the USA’s insecurity over its global hegemonic power, the findings of the shale gas 
exploration activities, and in addition, the remaining after effects of the 2008 global financial 
crisis. The powerful domestic social forces shaping his commitment to fracking would primarily 
be attributed to the USA’s Energy Information Agency and its findings. The social forces that 
were pushing Obama to honour his commitment to climate change can primarily be attributed 
to the Paris Agreement, and his ratchet mechanism. (Roberts, 2011). 
 
The Republican Party Convention in 2016 adopted a political platform that explicitly rejected 
any form of federal carbon price, and pledged to disengage the United States from any further 
involvement with the ‘non-binding’ Paris Agreement. The Democratic Party Convention in 2016 
supported both, a carbon tax, continuation of Obama’s climate policy programs, and fulfilment 
of pledges made in Paris. Presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton mirrored 
their party’s opposing views, hence representing starkly different ways forward for U.S. climate 
policy. (Roberts, 2011). 
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In sum, deep political polarisation over climate change prevents the United States from sending 
a clear signal to other countries that it is ready to address carbon emissions seriously and to 
lead the international process envisioned by the Paris Agreement. Potentially, the 2016 
presidential election could upset Obama’s climate leadership and put the United States back in 
a position where no credible federal climate policy initiatives exist. For the time being, 
therefore, the potential and willingness for the United States to lead is unclear. In relation to 
Green IPE and Neo-Gramscian theory, it can therefore be concluded that the US oil and gas 
industry is the most influential industries in the USA. This relates to the social relations 
described in Neo-Gramscian theory, such that the industry makes to elect relative 
representatives that will assist in furthering the goals of the industry, and secondly, a large 
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Chapter 6: USA’s Domestic Fossil Fuel Industry and Domestic Climate policy 
 
The chapter aims to discuss the shifts in the fossil fuel industry with a rise of renewables. This is 
followed by discussing the state shifts and Obama’s attempts to use the Clean Air Act, such that 
how he had been blocked in Congress, how things were changing, where fracking fits into this 
and whether it was transitionary. In relation to the theoretical perspective of the paper, the 
chapter relates to climate justice.  
 
As mentioned above, the United States is considered a leader in the production and supply of 
energy, and is one of the world’s largest energy consumers. U.S. energy companies produce oil, 
natural gas, coal, renewable fuels, as well as electricity from clean energy sources such as wind, 
solar, and nuclear power (U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2016). U.S. energy 
companies further transmit, distribute, and store energy through complex infrastructure 
networks that are supported by emerging products and services such as smart grid 
technologies. Growing consumer demand and world class innovation – combined with a 
competitive workforce and supply chain capable of building, installing, and servicing all energy 
technologies – make the United States the world’s most attractive market in the US$6 trillion 
global energy market. (U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2016). 
 
Renewable Energy: The United States is home to a thriving renewable energy industry, with 
globally competitive firms in all technology subsectors, including wind, solar, geothermal, 
hydropower, biomass, and biofuels. The United States currently produces more geothermal 
energy than any other country (2 640MW); more biomass power than any other country (15 
407MW); enjoys the second largest wind industry (73 751MW); the third largest hydropower 
industry (79 298MW); and the fourth largest solar industry (27 810MW) (International Trade 
Administration, 2016). According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), by 
2030, the share of renewables in the total U.S. energy mix could reach 27%. This would mean 
an increase from 134 GW of renewable energy in 2010 to over 700GW in just two decades 
(International Trade Administration, 2016). Even with less optimistic scenarios, the capacity is 
expected to double by 2030. On this trajectory, the United States already had the second 
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highest investment in the world in 2015, with nearly 16GW of new renewable energy capacity 
and US$ 91 billion in clean energy transactions (World Nuclear Association. 2016). In 2015, 
while clean energy investments slumped in Europe and Brazil, the United States increased by 
8% and accounted for 17% of the world’s total new renewable energy investment (World 
Nuclear Association. 2016).  
 
Renewable Fuels: In order to serve the overseas market and with access to abundant natural 
resources, the pellet and ethanol industries are also increasing their capacity (World Nuclear 
Association. 2016). The USA’s ethanol industry is considered to be the largest and most efficient 
in the world, incorporating technological innovations to produce nearly 15 billion gallons of 
ethanol annually. In addition, the industry is expanding to new markets (World Nuclear 
Association. 2016). During 2015, the U.S. ethanol industry exported an estimated 850 million 
gallons of ethanol (About 6% of its total production) to markets around the world (International 
Trade Administration, 2016).   Investment opportunities also exist for the development of 
advanced biofuels utilizing new technologies and feedstocks, particularly in the aviation sector. 
U.S. wood pellet manufacturers can now produce nearly 20 billion metric tons of pellets 
annually. In recent years, much of the production has been added to export to Europe. In 2015, 
over 4.5 million metric tons were exported and new pellet mills have been brought online to 
meet the growing demand. (International Trade Administration, 2016). 
 
Finding sustainable ways to obtain natural gas and oil is seen as the next option. Although 
fracking is by far the cheapest way to produce natural gas, there are companies that are trying 
to create natural gas from renewable sources (Kiger, 2014).  Wastewater is placed in large glass 
containers filled with nanoparticles and CO₂. When the sun hits the nanoparticles, they react 
with the wastewater to create hydrogen, which then bonds with the CO₂ to make methane. The 
methane can then be piped away to houses that use the natural gas for heating (Kiger, 2014). In 
addition, this process purifies the wastewater without the use of chemicals. The process relies 
entirely on photosynthesis, so no energy is used to create more energy. The process still needs 
to be perfected before it receives enough funding to become a viable option (Kiger, 2014).   
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Oil and Gas: The United States remain a major source of growth in oil and gas exploration and 
development, especially in shale and ultra-deep water resources, regardless of the low crude oil 
and natural gas global prices. U.S. companies have developed various advanced and cost-
competitive techniques for extracting hydrocarbons from shale and hard to reach offshore oil 
and gas deposits. As a result, many producers are able to remain competitive, in turn, making 
the United States the world’s swing producer.  As global oil and gas prices rise, production from 
U.S. shale formations is projected to increase substantially.  In addition to shale, offshore oil 
and gas resources in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and Alaska are part of a five-year leasing program 
under the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program for 2017-2022. The leasing 
program has been developed by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management within the U.S. 
Department of Interior. “Exporting crude oil from the United States has made the sector even 
more competitive, following the removal of crude oil export restrictions in December 2015. U.S. 
produced crude oil can now reach global markets and compete with other major oil and gas 
producing countries.” (International Trade Administration, 2016) 
 
Coal: The United States holds the world’s largest estimated recoverable reserves of coal and is a 
net exporter of coal (World Nuclear Association. 2016). In 2014, 79% of coal production 
originated in seven states: Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Montana, 
and Texas (International Trade Administration, 2016). Coal is used to generate 33% of the 
electricity in the United States, and is also used for industrial applications such as cement 
making, and conversion to coke for the smelting of iron ore at blast furnaces to make steel 
(World Nuclear Association. 2016). The United States is also developing carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies with the goal of capturing 90% of CO₂ emissions from coal to help 
allow coal to remain a strategic fuel for the nation while enhancing environmental protection 
(World Nuclear Association. 2016). 
 
Nuclear Energy: The United States operates the most nuclear reactors, has the largest installed 
nuclear power capacity, and generates the most nuclear power in the world. Nearly 20% of U.S. 
electricity is produced at 99 nuclear reactors in 31 states (World Nuclear Association. 2016). In 
2016, the first of 24 new nuclear reactors were expected to come on line. Subsectors of the civil 
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nuclear industry are represented by companies that produce nuclear components (reactors, 
nuclear monitoring instruments, boilers, heat exchangers, industrial valves, instrument 
modules, insulation, economizers for boilers, pumps and other reactor parts), nuclear fuel 
(uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, fuel assembly fabrication, and spent fuel storage), 
nuclear engineering and construction (site preparation, materials and equipment procurement, 
and construction), and nuclear advisory services (consulting on nuclear-related regulatory 
policies, human resources, and infrastructure; legal services; and operations and program 
management services). The international civil nuclear marketplace is estimated at more than 
US$500 ‐ US$740 billion during the next decade and has the potential to generate more than 
US$100 billion in U.S. exports and thousands of new jobs. (World Nuclear Association. 2016). 
 
Energy Efficiency: The market and demand to achieve greater energy efficiency in the United 
States is large and growing. Combined financing and investment in building, industrial, and 
supply side energy efficiency doubled in 2012, exceeding US$ 15 billion in funds (International 
Trade Administration, 2016). “Existing policies, such as Federal appliance standards, along with 
other Federal and State policies, and market forces are drivers of energy efficiency in the 
United States. For example, in 2013, President Obama had announced the goal to double 
energy productivity, measured by gross domestic product per unit of energy use, from the 2010 
level by 2030. A roadmap to achieving this goal was published in September 2015 and it is 
expected that an additional US$ 166 billion will need to be invested annually in building 
improvements, energy efficient vehicles and industrial equipment, and energy savings 
transportation systems to achieve this goal” (International Trade Administration, 2016). 
 
Smart Grid: The United States is an international leader in the development and deployment of 
smart grid technologies and services. The smart grid subsector is defined by the electric grid 
equipment and services required for the modernization of distribution and transmission 
systems, as well as the information and communication technologies (ICT) (a sector that is 
steadily gaining renewed focus on investment) that support a fully networked grid and enable 
two-way communications and electric flows (International Trade Administration, 2016). Some 
of the reasons for increased investment are reliability enhancement, connecting to renewables, 
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demand shifts, cost increases, and market reforms that create more options for independent 
generators and as such require new connections to transmission systems (International Trade 
Administration, 2016).  
 
This includes a strong interest from national utilities to address the potential effects of 
distributed energy resources. Since 2009, investment in the modernisation of the national 
electricity infrastructure has increased dramatically. This is in large part due to the Smart Grid 
Investment Grant projects, which involves more than 200 electric utilities, and costing 
approximately US$8 billion in 99 public-private partnerships (PPP). “These projects have helped 
push the deployment of smart meters to more than 40% of the country’s 144.51 million 
electricity consumers. In addition to public-private programs like the SGIG, investor-owned 
utility investment in grid modernization continues to rise. For example, since 2001 investor-
owned utility transmission system investment grew at a compound annual growth rate of over 
20% reaching almost US$ 20 billion” (International Trade Administration, 2016). 
 
6.1) Impact on the growth of the USA energy sector on the environment 
 
The environmental impact on the energy industry is diverse. Energy has been harnessed by 
human beings for millennia. Initially it was with the use of fire for light, heat, cooking and for 
safety, and its use can be traced back at least 1.9 million years. In recent years there has been a 
trend towards the increased commercialisation of various renewable energy sources. (Bowman, 
Balch, Artaxo, Bond, Carlson, Cochrane, D’Antonio, DeFries, Doyle, Harrison, Johnston, Keeley, 
Krawchuk, Kull, Marston, Moritz, Prentice, Roos, Scott, Swetnam, van der Werf & Pyne, 2009). 
 
Consumption of fossil fuel resources leads to global warming and climate change. In most parts 
of the world little change is being made to slow these changes. If the peak oil theory proves 
true, and more explorations of viable alternative energy sources are made, the human impact 
could be less hostile to the environment. Rapidly advancing technologies can achieve a 
transition of energy generation, water and waste management, and food production towards 
better environmental and energy usage practices using methods of systems ecology and 
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industrial energy. (Bowman, Balch, Artaxo, Bond, Carlson, Cochrane, D’Antonio, DeFries, Doyle, 
Harrison, Johnston, Keeley, Krawchuk, Kull, Marston, Moritz, Prentice, Roos, Scott, Swetnam, 
van der Werf & Pyne, 2009). 
 
6.2) The growth of fracking in the USA and its impact on the environment 
 
The environmental impact of fracking affects land use and water consumption, methane 
emissions, air emissions, water contamination, noise pollution, and health. Water and air 
pollution are the biggest risks to human health from hydraulic fracturing (Clark, Burnham, Harto 
& Horner, 2013). Research is underway to determine if human health has been affected, and 
rigorous adherence to regulation and safety procedures is required to avoid harm. Noise from 
hydraulic fracturing and associated transport can also affect residents and local wildlife (Clark, 
Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013).  
 
Hydraulic fracturing fluids include proppants and other substances, which may include toxic 
chemicals. In the United States, such additives may be treated as trade secrets by companies 
who use them (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). Lack of knowledge about specific 
chemicals has complicated efforts to develop risk management policies and to study health 
effects (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). In other jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom, these chemicals must be made public and their applications are required to be 
nonhazardous (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). 
 
Water usage by hydraulic fracturing can be a problem in areas that experience water shortage. 
Surface water may be contaminated through spillage and improperly built and maintained 
waste pits, in jurisdictions where these are permitted (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). 
Further, ground water can be contaminated if fluid is able to escape during fracking. Produced 
water, the water that returns to the surface after fracking, is managed by underground 
injection, municipal and commercial wastewater treatment, and reuse in future wells (Clark, 
Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). There is potential for methane to leak into ground water and 
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the air, though escape of methane is a bigger problem in older wells than in those built under 
more recent legislation (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013).  
 
Hydraulic fracturing causes induced seismicity called micro-seismic events or micro-
earthquakes. The magnitude of these events is too small to be detected at the surface, being of 
magnitude M-3 to M-1 usually (Clark, Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). However, fluid disposal 
wells (which are often used in the USA to dispose of polluted waste from several industries) 
have been responsible for earthquakes up to 5.6M in Oklahoma and other states (Clark, 
Burnham, Harto & Horner, 2013). 
  
Governments worldwide are developing regulatory frameworks to assess and 
manage environmental and associated health risks, working under pressure from industry on 
the one hand, and from anti-fracking groups on the other (Lechtenbömer, Altmann, Capito, 
Matra, Weindorf & Zittel, 2011). In comparison, some countries like France has a precautionary 
approach that has been favored and hydraulic fracturing has been banned. Some countries 
such as the USA have adopted the approach of identifying risks before regulating 
(Lechtenbömer, Altmann, Capito, Matra, Weindorf & Zittel, 2011). The United Kingdom’s 
regulatory framework is based on the conclusion that the risks associated with hydraulic 
fracturing are manageable if carried out under effective regulation and if operational best 
practices are implemented (Lechtenbömer, Altmann, Capito, Matra, Weindorf & Zittel, 2011).  
 
Environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing in the United States has been an issue of public 
concern, and includes the potential contamination of ground and surface water, methane 
emissions, air pollution, migration of gases and hydraulic fracturing chemicals and radionuclides 
to the surface, the potential mishandling of solid waste, drill cuttings, increased seismicity and 
associated effects on human and ecosystem health. A number of instances with groundwater 
contamination have been documented, however opponents of water safety regulation claim 
hydraulic fracturing has never caused any drinking water contamination. 
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As early as 1987, researchers at the EPA expressed concern that hydraulic fracturing might 
contaminate groundwater (van der Walt, 2016). With the growth of hydraulic fracturing in the 
United States in the following years, concern grew (van der Walt, 2016). It was not until 2010 
that Congress asked the EPA to conduct a full study of the environmental impact of fracking 
(van der Walt, 2016). The study is ongoing, but the EPA released a progress report in December 
2012 and released a final draft assessment report for peer review and comment in June 2015 
(van der Walt, 2016).  
 
6.2.1) Obama's Clean Air Act 
 
Although many hoped that years of inaction against greenhouse gas emissions by the United 
States was nearing to an end, however President Obama soon found himself facing a Congress 
quick to oppose his initiatives across a spectrum of issues, and climate change seemed to take a 
back seat to other important concerns, and it was only in his second term that his 
administration was able to renew its focus on climate change (Outka, 2016). In June 2013, the 
president announced a new Climate Action Plan at Georgetown University, which aimed to cut 
carbon pollution; protect the country from the impacts of climate change; and to lead the world 
in a coordinated assault on a changing climate (Outka, 2016). He acknowledged that as the 
world’s largest economy and second largest carbon emitter, the USA had a ‘unique 
responsibility’ to fulfil (Outka, 2016). 
 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) was a single statute that provided critical executive authority for 
advancing the former president’s climate change goals (Outka, 2016). The Clean Air Act of 1970 
was the first comprehensive federal environmental regulatory program. Today, it remains the 
primary federal environmental law that controls air pollution from mobile sources, like cars and 
trucks, and from stationary sources, like factories, refineries, and power plants (Outka, 2016). 
 
Under the UNFCCC, the US and nearly every other nation in the world has declared a common 
goal and shared commitment to averting catastrophic climate change. The complicated history 
of the US’s role in this treaty and its implementation forms an important backdrop to the 
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administration’s second-term approach to domestic climate action (Outka, 2016). This approach 
had been multi-faceted, combining regulatory action by federal agencies with executive orders 
and bilateral talks that were pivotal to the domestic and international aspects of the 
administration’s climate mitigation strategy. Understanding the Clean Air Act’s role is especially 
important now that all eyes are on the U.S. and other major emitting countries to achieve the 
goals outlined in a new international agreement penned at the close of 2015 in Paris, France by 
the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the Framework Convention (Outka, 2016). 
 
The U.S. was among the first nations to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, marking a landmark international agreement to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to mitigate global climate change. For every U.S. president 
following President George H.W. Bush, who signed the Convention, the UNFCC has provided the 
formal structure for international dialogue and policy negotiations on climate change. (Outka, 
2016). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s structural emphasis on developed nations’ obligations became politically 
divisive in the U.S. Despite significant involvement with the Protocol’s design under the Clinton 
Administration, the U.S. ultimately declined to ratify it under President George W. Bush, due to 
fears that the U.S. would suffer economically if targets did not apply to polluting developing 
countries, namely China and India. This was seen as a major setback to the success of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Protocol eventually went into effect after a struggle to secure sufficient 
signatories to account for the U.S.’s absence, and as a result the U.S. leadership position in 
climate change negotiations was seriously undercut. Throughout the second Bush 
Administration, although the U.S. maintained its official posture of commitment to the shared 
aims of the UNFCCC, the U.S. was widely regarded as a blocking agent, no longer a facilitator, of 
international climate progress. (Outka, 2016). 
 
When Barack Obama was elected, a renewed commitment to climate change mitigation was 
among his stated priorities. Domestically, many thought that nationwide climate change 
legislation would be imminently forthcoming in his first term after the House of Representatives 
Bulbul Shrivastava  433959 
USA’s Policies on Fracking  University of the Witwatersrand 
Page 82 of 126 
 
passed a comprehensive climate bill; but it did not pass in the Senate. In 2009, on the 
international stage, President Obama pledged the U.S. would cut GHG emissions by 17% below 
2005 levels by the year 2020. Yet his first major public foray into climate change negotiations, at 
the 2009 Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark, ended in frustration, protests, and 
few notable successes. The Obama Administration’s subsequent role internationally on climate 
issues, at least for the remainder of his first term, had a lower profile. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Facing intense political opposition on a range of other priorities, the congressional gridlock on 
domestic climate change policy did not speak well for the Administration’s prospects with new 
international commitments. The experience of the Clinton-Gore White House during the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations was a cautionary tale. Seeing no near-term potential for meaningful 
climate legislation, President Obama turned his attention to the potential for climate progress 
under existing statutory authority. Reflecting this reorientation toward executive action, the 
Clean Air Act had been the focal point of the Obama Administration’s efforts to achieve climate 
change mitigation goals, particularly in the second term. (Outka, 2016). 
 
However, the origins of the CAA’s centrality to domestic climate mitigation traces to before 
President Obama’s election to the 2007 landmark Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. 
EPA. In that case, the EPA under the second Bush Administration rejected petitions to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. In its 5-4 decision, however, the Court held that 
the EPA did have statutory authority to regulate GHGs under § 202 of the CAA and that the EPA’s 
avoidance of GHG regulation was arbitrary. According to the Court, the statute required the 
agency to justify its position, if it could, with a reasoned Endangerment Finding – essentially, a 
determination of whether GHGs endanger public health and welfare. (Outka, 2016). 
 
The authority recognised by the case provided the foundation for the Obama Administration’s 
substantive CAA regulatory agenda pertaining to GHGs. It was President Obama’s new EPA 
Administrator, Lisa Jackson who issued the affirmative Endangerment Finding for GHGs from 
mobile sources. The administration followed this finding, as the CAA requires, with new 
regulations of vehicle emissions and fuel economy standards; but soon after, its regulatory focus 
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expanded to include an even more significant source of GHGs within the energy sector: electric 
power plants. (Outka, 2016). 
 
The administration’s CAA work was significant in several other key respects, however, separate 
and apart from how the Clean Power Plan litigation resolves. First, the CAA rule-making eroded 
the perception that congressional gridlock was an impervious barrier to climate progress. There 
are indications now across the economy that a low carbon turn is increasingly being seen as 
inevitable. In the months leading up to COP 21, major companies across a range of industries 
made public statements in support of a binding climate agreement in Paris. These rules were 
undoubtedly a shift that could be a powerful force behind the technological innovation some 
have argued for as a primary response to climate change. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Second, proceeding with rulemaking for greenhouse gases under the CAA avoided a gap that 
might have been created post-Mass. v. EPA in the absence of agency action. The 2011 Supreme 
Court Case American Electric Power v. Connecticut made clear that the effect of Mass. v. EPA 
was to pre-empt federal common law litigation relating to greenhouse gas emissions. In 
American Electric Power, a case initiated before the ruling in Mass. v. EPA, a coalition of eight 
states, New York City, and three land trusts sued the nation’s biggest utilities under public 
nuisance theories, seeking to enjoin emissions reductions. There, the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously that although the EPA had not yet exercised its authority to regulate greenhouse 
gases, recognition of that authority by the Court in Mass. v. EPA was sufficient to pre-empt the 
claims. Without the administration’s subsequent rulemaking, the impact of American Electric 
Power’s pre-emption ruling would have been a more consequential limitation on common law 
in the climate context. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Third, the administration’s CAA agenda carried significance in the Framework Convention 
context and for the U.S. posture approaching COP21. This was reflected in the preamble to the 
Clean Power Plan final rule, released within months of the Conference, which explained that the 
“rule establishes the foundation for longer term GHG emission reduction strategies necessary to 
address climate change and, in so doing, confirms the international leadership of the U.S. in the 
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global effort to address climate change.” Taken together, the CAA rules were central to the 
President’s effort to reassert an effective and credible leadership role for the U.S. in 
international climate negotiations. Further, this work provided a basis for the President to 
pursue bilateral climate agreements with China, India, and Brazil, widely viewed as important to 
shifting the dynamic that prevented U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol. (Outka, 2016). 
 
The statement in the Clean Power Plan preamble also reflected recognition that climate change 
would require further decarbonization than this rule alone could achieve. Policy critiques of this 
centerpiece regulation predictably ranged from assertions that the rule was too aggressive, to 
worries that the rule did not do enough. Among those arguing the Clean Power Plan was too 
aggressive were coal companies and states who filed lawsuits challenging the rule even before it 
was final, hoping for (but failing to obtain) preliminary injunctions on the rule-making. (Outka, 
2016). 
 
The force of the administration’s CAA agenda would be an important aspect of Obama’s climate 
legacy, but it would not be the only factor shaping perspectives on the president’s commitment 
to the UNFCCC’s core aspiration. Seemingly mixed messages from the administration had been 
hard for observers to reconcile with the commitment that seemed to underlie the CAA rules. 
Three controversial issues in particular had troubled advocates of strong climate policy during 
the Obama Presidency, and only in the following months had they begun to resolve. (Outka, 
2016). 
 
The president’s domestic climate action used existing law and does, at minimum, two things 
relative to the international law context. First, it fulfilled the longstanding obligation for 
‘national policies’ under the Convention, and second, it made efforts to lead on the 
international stage more credible. A third function, particularly applicable to the CAA regulatory 
agenda, may have been to provide a basis for the president to enter in a new binding climate 
agreement. According to international law Professor David Wirth, laws that were already in 
place domestically, including those “undertaken by the executive branch unilaterally,” provided 
“sufficient firm legal footing that the president could confidently make parallel legally binding 
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international commitments that tracked those domestic undertakings.” Likewise, Professor 
Daniel Bodansky concludes that: “depending on its contents, the president might have been 
able to join the Paris Agreement on the basis of existing constitutional, statutory, and treaty 
authority, without submitting it to the Senate or Congress for approval.” In these ways, the 
Obama Administration’s Clean Air Act rule-making was central to the climate change legacy that 
would emerge in time, as well as to the present and future U.S. negotiating posture and ability 
to meet international obligations for climate change mitigation. (Outka, 2016). 
 
The White House, under Obama's Administration announced a new plan to crack down on the 
oil and gas industry’s emissions of methane, a potent greenhouse gas. The move was the last 
major piece of President Obama’s domestic climate agenda, following in the footsteps of 
tougher standards for vehicle emissions and a sweeping plan to curb CO₂ emissions from power 
plants. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Like the power plant plan, the methane standards would rely on the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s authority to regulate pollution under the Clean Air Act. The new rules would regulate 
the amount of methane that oil and gas producers were allowed to vent or leak from their 
wells, pipelines, and other equipment. Ultimately, according to the White House, the rules 
would aim to cut methane emissions by 40%-45% by 2025. The proposal was intended to be 
finalised before Obama left office, but it was certain to take a battering along the way from 
congressional Republicans and fossil fuel interest groups. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Methane makes up a much smaller portion of America’s greenhouse gas footprint than carbon 
dioxide – the volume of methane released in a year is roughly 10 times smaller than the volume 
of CO₂ – so the proposal might have seemed like a small issue. Whereas on the contrary, it is 
quite the opposite for a few reasons. (Outka, 2016). 
 
Locking in climate protection: An underlying assumption of Obama’s carbon emissions plan 
was that many power plants would switch from burning coal to burning natural gas. But 
methane, the principal emission of natural gas consumption, is 20 times more powerful than 
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CO₂ over a 100-year timespan. The problem is less with natural gas-burning power plants 
themselves than with the infrastructure (pipes, and compressors, among others) needed to get 
gas from where it’s drilled to where it’s burned – and also with venting, the burning of excess 
gas from wells. So far, those bits and pieces have proved exceptionally leaky – some studies 
have found up to 7.9% of the methane from natural gas production simply escapes into the air. 
(Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, 2016). 
 
Saving money and energy: Methane leaks are not only bad for the climate, but are also bad for 
business. According to a recent analysis conducted by New York University, between 1 and 3% 
of all U.S. natural gas production is lost to leaks and venting, enough to heat more than 6 million 
homes. A separate study from the World Resources Institute estimated a loss of gas at $1.5 
billion per year. Plugging leaks and limiting venting from drilling sites would keep more gas on 
the market. (Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, 2016). 
 
Cleaning up fracking: Behind any conversation about natural gas is always the specter of 
fracking. Of course, there are many concerns about fracking that have nothing to do with 
methane emissions: Public health issues related to water contamination, for example, or 
earthquakes. But stringent methane rules could alleviate some of the climate-related concerns 
about the fracking boom and could help refocus the debate around local pollution and land 
rights issues. (Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, 2016). 
 
In relation to climate justice, it can be concluded that the Obama Administration was a leader in 
preventing climate change. Although Obama was not able to have much influence in the 
Congress during first term, this however changed in his second term as president. The 
administration aimed to crack down on its oil and gas industry, by implementing the Clean Air 
Act and regulating the methane emissions, as well as aim to meet the international obligations 
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From the paper, it can be seen that Green IPE focuses on the power of the fossil fuel industry. 
Whereas Neo-Gramscian theory relates to hegemony and the structural power within a state. 
And climate justice focuses on the policies of the fossil fuel industries. Therefore, with regards 
to the key research question posed for the study, it can be concluded that fracking is not a 
sustainable way to obtain natural gas and oil even though it makes us, the U.S., less dependent 
on foreign oil and gas (McBride & Sergie, 2015). Not only do the disadvantages outweigh the 
advantages, but the process of fracking breaks the laws of climate justice and sustainability.  
 
Even though fracking gives the economy revenue, provides jobs and makes the U.S. less 
dependent on foreign oil it is not worth making the earth sick through environmental damage 
and people sick through exposure to unknown chemical mixtures in their water and air 
pollutants (Anderson, 2014.). Also, if the environment deteriorates or the resources that are 
finite, which are needed in the fracking process are used up because fracking continues on at 
the rate it is going then over time hydraulic fracturing would have to cease because these 
resources would be severely depleted, to the extent that the fracking industry would not be 
able to continue as it has been doing currently (Taskinsoy, 2013: 16). 
 
The rise of the fracking industry bolsters the nation’s geopolitical status in many ways. Firstly, it 
provides low-cost hydrocarbons for energy-intensive industries like cement manufacturing and 
aluminium smelting, thus sparking a ‘new industrial revolution’ and strengthening the US 
economy. It is also to be noted that it helps liberate the US from constrictive ties to foreign 
heads of states (Klare, 2014). Furthermore, it advances the US’s national security by rendering 
the it as being less vulnerable to political and security-related disruptions of its energy supply. 
In terms of power relations, former national security adviser to President Obama, Tom Donilon, 
mentioned that America’s new energy independent position allows it to engage from a position 
of greater strength (Klare, 2014). Increasing US energy supplies act as a cushion that helps 
reduce its vulnerability to global supply disruptions and price shocks. It also allows the US to 
have an upper hand in pursuing and implementing its international security goals. (Klare, 2014). 
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Finding sustainable ways to obtain natural gas and oil is seen as the next option. Although 
fracking is by far the cheapest way to produce natural gas, there are companies that are trying 
to create natural gas from renewable sources.  The process still needs to be perfected before it 
receives enough funding to become a viable option. In addition, there is research being done on 
‘gas fracking’ as an alternative to hydraulic fracking (Mcelroy & Lu, 2013). In gas fracking, a thick 
propane gel is pumped into the ground instead of water. The gel contains the same materials as 
the water that keeps the shale open so gas can be collected (Mcelroy & Lu, 2013). However, the 
gel itself vaporizes, and returns to the surface to be collected and reused, with none of the 
contaminants that water brings up (Mcelroy & Lu, 2013). Although the gel is more expensive, it 
allows more gas to be extracted, and costs less in truck trips because there is no need to get 
more water (Mcelroy & Lu, 2013). More caution must be used because the gel is explosive, but 
it still seems to be a viable alternative for the future (Mcelroy & Lu, 2013).  
 
It is important to realize that fracking is such a new industry that there are many unknown 
things, such as the full impacts that fracking can have on the environment, humans or the 
economy (McBride & Sergie, 2015). All that can be done is hypothesise from the research that 
has been given. Furthermore, it’s still uncertain whether more sustainable ways of fracking will 
work out or prove to be just as controversial as the current way. (McBride & Sergie, 2015). 
 
To build an effective climate agreement and to strengthen it over time, states might rely on two 
main types of factors—norms and incentives. An ideal agreement would ensure that both 
norms and incentives push the parties to make serious efforts to reduce emissions and to 
gradually reinforce those efforts. (McBride & Sergie, 2015). 
 
The Paris Agreement currently relies disproportionately on norms, while doing little to 
restructure states’ incentives so as to deter free riding. Norms and incentives thus pull in 
opposite directions, meaning that the outcome will depend on the force of each factor (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). Because virtually all economic 
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activity entails emissions of GHGs, the incentive to free ride is much stronger in the context of 
climate change than in the context of other international environmental cooperation (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
historical record of climate change cooperation suggests that the force of incentives has thus 
far outweighed that of norms. Judged by this record, the Paris Agreement may well suffer a fate 
similar to Kyoto’s. Kyoto, too, aimed for a series of 5-year periods with new and more ambitious 
commitments in every period. Yet already by the end of the first period, this architecture was 
clearly not viable. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016). 
 
On a more optimistic note, norms can change. For example, the Paris Agreement shows that 
today’s interpretation of the common-but-differentiated responsibilities norm differs from that 
of the 1990s and 2000s (Mitchell, 2015). Consequently, the cards are now stacked somewhat 
less in favour of incentives than they were then. Domestic and international norms may well 
continue to develop such that it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals, firms, and states 
to ignore pleas to limit and reduce their carbon footprints (Mitchell, 2015). In addition, 
technological progress may gradually lessen abatement costs. Such developments would 
further favour norms over incentives (Mitchell, 2015). Finally, if major emitters such as the 
United States prove able and willing to take the lead, it might further strengthen cooperative 
norms and limit other countries’ costs of compliance. Such developments might ultimately pave 
the way for a transformation from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness in the 
field of climate change (Mitchell, 2015).  
 
The powerful domestic forces that shaped Obama’s commitment to fracking were based on the 
findings of the exploration activities and the 2008 global financial crisis. If the US follows 
through with announced policies, it is predicted that there will be a reduction of emissions by 
16% to 32% of 2005 levels by 2025 (Dlouhy, 2016). So if the Paris goals are to be met, additional 
measures to cut greenhouse gases are necessary. Achievement of these goals have major 
international importance. Jeffery Greenblatt, a climate researcher at the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, said: "if the United States is successful it’s very likely that a number of 
other countries will follow suit and re-strengthen their own commitments" (Potenza, 2016). 
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Unfortunately, between the historical political climate and the uncertainty and volatility 
surrounding Trump’s Administration, bold action may be difficult for the US to accomplish. It is 
evident that the hegemonic powers of the US have been shaken by the rise of China and India’s 
growth on the international platform which has led to the insecurity regarding its hegemonic 
status. (Potenza, 2016). 
 
For two decades now, the US has repeatedly been against any type of progress that was being 
delicately arranged towards combatting climate change. It has not been alone in compromising 
the negotiations, but its intransigence has provided a shield behind which, many other nations 
can conveniently hide (Roberts, 2011: 781). The US government’s unwillingness to take active 
steps to address this looming global crisis is exactly the kind of failure of leadership among 
hegemons that leads to their decline. The US’s fear of job loss to China lay behind the July 1997 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution that arguably sunk the Kyoto Protocol, tying the Clinton Administration’s 
hands the summer before the COP 3 in that Japanese city (Roberts, 2011: 781).  The US’s 
obstinacy in the climate negotiations is driven by fear of job loss and competitiveness to 
specifically, China and India, among others. In turn, China and other rapidly developing nations 
fear the treaty being used by the US and others to dampen their growth (Roberts, 2011: 781). 
From this, it can be seen that the policies of fracking does undermine the US’s hegemonic role 
in climate negotiations on the global platform. Drawing on the neo-Gramscian perspective, 
should the domestic hegemon be weak, then this has implications for extending hegemony to 
the global level. However, in the case of this study, fracking operations are able to continue 
despite environmental movements aimed combatting climate change.  
 
So far, however, deep political polarisation has represented a significant barrier to the U.S. 
leadership on climate change. Thus, while the Paris Agreement could become the start of a race 
to the top that sets the world on a path towards solving the climate change problem, it might 
also end as a failure, much like the Kyoto Protocol. The latter outcome is particularly plausible if 
the United States and other major emitters prove unable or unwilling to lead. However, as 
mentioned above, and newly-elected President Donald Trump’s decision to exit from the Paris 
Agreement signifies that the fracking industry has a large impact on the USA’s foreign policy 
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towards climate change – a disregard for the impact of climate change. This  will ensure that 
climate change occurs with even greater fury than previously assumed, posing an intensified 
threat to the safety and survival of US cities, farms, forests and coastlines. No other challenge 
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